Interview
#43 - Daniel Ellsberg on the institutional insanity that maintains nuclear doomsday machines
- The paperback edition of The Doomsday Machine is scheduled for release on December 5th of the current year, with plans to digitalize omitted files and publish them online.
- The author anticipates that a full-scale nuclear exchange between the U.S. and Russia involving 100 to 200 cities would cause a 70% reduction in sunlight, destroying global harvests for a decade and leading to the starvation of nearly the entire population, with only an estimated 70 million people (1% of humans) surviving in the Southern Hemisphere by consuming marine life.
- The author asserts that the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is very small, but any armed conflict between the U.S. and Russia carries a high risk of escalating to nuclear use, with a low probability of remaining limited once initiated.
- The author contends that counterforce strategies and the ability to control or limit a nuclear war have been delusional for over half a century, noting that weapons would likely be disconnected from central command early in a conflict due to satellite reliance.
- The text highlights the risk of false alarms, such as the Hawaii alert, suggesting that a decision not to launch might not be countermanded, yet the President lacks the physical capability or code to stop weapons once launched, and commanders may act before receiving orders due to the "use it or lose it" incentive regarding vulnerable ICBMs.
- Historical intelligence failures are cited, including the Air Force's overestimation of Soviet ICBM numbers (claiming 1,000 in 1961 vs. near-zero actual counts), the delusion of a Nazi-like Russia, and the realization that the U.S. held a strategic advantage in the early 1960s that could have allowed for a first strike with no U.S. casualties.
- The author claims military budgets are driven by profits, jobs, and political donations, and that the Defense Department avoids realistic nuclear winter studies because acknowledging the catastrophic outcomes would hinder weapon sales, despite classified data on targets and yields existing within the agency and the National Academy of Sciences.
- Proposals to reduce nuclear arsenals include the U.S. unilaterally eliminating ICBMs, reducing submarine forces threatening Russian land-based missiles, and bringing both superpower arsenals down to a survivable range of 80 to 120 weapons, potentially by disarming thermonuclear secondaries.
- The author predicts that Russia lacks the ability to eliminate its ICBMs due to submarine vulnerability to American anti-submarine warfare, making the U.S. reduction of submarine forces a stabilizing measure that would not encourage a launch-on-warning posture.
- Political and historical analysis suggests that NATO expansion and Cold War rhetoric served as marketing campaigns for the arms industry, with Trump's policies aligning with predecessors in maintaining nuclear threats, while previous administrations like Obama showed some preference for ICBM elimination.
- The author draws parallels between nuclear weapons lobbying and other industries like tobacco and Purdue Pharma, arguing for criminal prosecutions, legislative reform, and the empowerment of whistleblowers who should be protected by a public interest defense against laws like the Espionage Act.
- The text notes that the U.S. should not prepare for war with Russia or engage in a war with China over Taiwan, and that the use of nuclear weapons for revenge or retaliation is deemed unjustified and practically inevitable if a retaliatory capability is maintained.
- The author expresses hope that Marines in policy positions may become a force for change, while remaining skeptical that the general public or past presidents have been fully briefed on nuclear winter or the true scale of risks, such as the 10% probability of atmospheric ignition during the Trinity test.
- The author advocates for external pressure and investigative work within Congress as necessary to confront powerful corporations and advance arms control, citing the test ban treaty and the growth of ecology as examples of successful outside intervention.