newsfilter.io
Interview

a16z Podcast | Apple and Google Won the Mobile OS War, But a New War Has Already Begun

  • Mobile OS Market Status:

    • The mobile operating system "war" is effectively over, leaving two dominant ecosystems: iOS and Android.
    • Current quarterly market share: iOS holds ~10% of global phone sales; Android holds ~45–50% (with ~2/3 being Google Android and ~1/3 being China-specific variants without Google services).
    • Remaining market (~40%) is expected to convert to smartphones over the next 3–4 years, with a permanent residue of 5–10% of low-affordance users.
    • Future hardware competition will focus on low-price segments ($25–$75) rather than high-end innovation, with competitors like Microsoft (Windows Phone) and Nokia selling in small volumes (e.g., 500k–600k units in the US last quarter).
    • Predicted end-state usage: 700–900 million iOS devices and 2–3 billion Android devices globally.
    • Total addressable mobile user base is estimated at 3.5–4 billion people (3–4 billion SIM cards), though the primary value-generating segment is the top 2–2.5 billion users.
  • Value Distribution and Customer Demographics:

    • iOS concentrates on high-value customers; ~50% of Android devices are $20–$30 units with users spending $1–$5 monthly.
    • Android's average user value is significantly lower than iOS due to a broader range of price points, though Android still holds a massive absolute number of high-value users ($500–$600 phones).
    • Enterprise and corporate buyers are irrelevant to mobile sales dynamics, which are driven by individual consumer choice based on design, fit, and user experience rather than specs or bulk pricing.
    • Comparison to the PC era is deemed unhelpful; unlike the 1990s, the mobile market does not operate on a "winner-takes-all" trajectory where the largest ecosystem automatically sucks all value, as retailers must support both iOS and Android regardless of market share disparity.
  • Strategic Divergence of Apple and Google:

    • Apple: Focuses on hardware excellence and owning the full stack, moving "down the stack" to control hardware-specific innovations like Bluetooth, iBeacon, and motion processors (e.g., AirDrop, battery optimization via M7 chip).
    • Google: Functions as a machine learning engine rather than a hardware company (post-Motorola sale); moves "up the stack" to leverage cloud services, search, maps, and data indexing via Play Services.
    • Google and Apple have "won" the platform war by securing their respective goals: Google secures search/advertising reach and user data; Apple secures hardware revenue and a premium user base.
    • Google treats Facebook and Amazon as primary competitors, while Apple treats its primary battle as maintaining hardware quality and ecosystem stickiness.
    • Microsoft and Amazon are attempting to build "forked" Android versions or custom ecosystems, but these are viewed as niche skirmishes with no threat to the iOS/Android duopoly.
  • Future Interaction Models and Discovery:

    • The definition of "apps" is evolving; future interactions may involve dynamic cards, web apps, or content embedded in messaging platforms (e.g., WeChat, WhatsApp, Line) rather than traditional native installs.
    • App stores currently resemble early 2000s Yahoo—browsable directories of millions of items lacking effective discovery mechanisms comparable to web SEO.
    • New discovery paradigms are emerging through deep linking within messaging apps, where content can be interacted with without a formal "installation."
    • Startups face a paradox of scale: mobile allows for 100 million users with only 10 employees and $1M raised, contrasting with the 100 employees/$10M/$1M user model of the first internet bubble.
    • Entrepreneurial strategy should focus on leveraging the mobile platform's richness (always-on, personal, data-rich) rather than attempting to replicate PC-era web models.
  • Forward-Looking Trends:

    • Emerging form factors beyond "phones" (phablets, smartwatches, glasses) will require new acronyms (e.g., "smotch," "wablet") and interaction models.
    • Platform owners (Apple/Google) do not have full control over the "swirling soup" of interaction layers defined by third parties like Facebook or messaging giants.
    • Apple is unlikely to lower its average price point significantly (beyond the iPhone 5c) to avoid diluting its high-value customer base, similar to BMW's strategy of maintaining quality while expanding down-market.
    • The mobile internet will eventually supplant the desktop PC as the dominant computing and internet platform, though the specific mechanics of software delivery (native vs. web vs. hybrid) remain undefined.