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Interview

Alex Tabarrok - Prizes, Prices, and Public Goods

  • Grand Innovation Prizes for Pandemics:

    • Current incentives for vaccine manufacturers are insufficient because companies typically wait for FDA approval before ramping up factory capacity due to the high risk of failure.
    • Prizes (e.g., a $1 billion award for a vaccine meeting specific efficacy/safety criteria) or advanced market commitments (paying for at-risk manufacturing costs) are proposed to provide "extra juice" for speed.
    • While prizes avoid the government picking winners/losers, upfront funding for manufacturing costs is being prioritized for current pandemic efforts as it is cheaper and faster to deploy "all guns blazing."
    • The speaker acknowledges that this approach involves waste and funding failing projects (e.g., AstraZeneca's halted trial) but argues the trillions in pandemic costs justify a diverse portfolio of "shots on goal."
  • Critique of Current Policy & Congress:

    • Congress is criticized for being "lazy, slow, and complacent," taking ages to fund testing and failing to spend allocated funds.
    • Existing laws allow agencies to set up prizes ranging from $50 million to $50 billion without new legislation, yet these mechanisms have not been utilized.
    • The speaker advocates for "state capacity libertarianism," stating a desire for a small government that is nonetheless capable of performing its functions during crises.
  • The Baumol Effect (Cost Disease):

    • Prices in sectors with slow productivity growth (e.g., education, healthcare, repairs) rise inexorably because the opportunity cost of labor increases as the "progressive sector" (tech, manufacturing) becomes more productive.
    • A string quartet today requires the same 40 minutes and four musicians as in 1826, but the cost is higher because those workers could earn significantly more in productive sectors.
    • As the "Great Stagnation" slows productivity growth in the progressive sector, the rate of price inflation in stagnant sectors (like healthcare) should also slow, which aligns with recent data.
    • Wage stagnation for unskilled labor is partly explained by the rising opportunity cost of skilled labor (e.g., PhDs), who are pulled toward high-paying tech sectors, leaving education and healthcare to pay a premium for these workers despite lower productivity gains.
  • Education and AI Disruption:

    • The speaker argues for increasing educational attainment but rebalancing the mix: more high school graduates and vocational training (like German apprenticeships) rather than sending everyone to college for low-utility degrees (e.g., journalism, psychology).
    • Online education (e.g., Marginal Revolution University, Georgia Tech's online master's) allows for massive scaling, potentially driving average teachers out of business while paying top-tier instructors like sports stars.
    • AI and artificial tutors can pinpoint student errors and deliver personalized instruction more effectively than human tutors, though the "credentialing" function of universities remains a hurdle.
    • Future models may involve "debundled" education: online lectures for instruction and human coaches for motivation and skill mapping.
  • Dominant Insurance Contracts:

    • A "dominant insurance contract" solves public goods free-rider problems by offering a refund bonus to contributors if a funding threshold is not met, making it a dominant strategy to contribute regardless of the outcome.
    • Unlike standard assurance contracts (e.g., Kickstarter), this mechanism ensures contributors are better off either way, potentially doubling the success rate of public good projects in controlled experiments.
    • The mechanism does not solve problems regarding the optimal scale of public goods (e.g., how big a bridge should be) but solves the coordination of funding.
    • The speaker suggests this, alongside blockchain governance experiments (e.g., "Futarchy" prediction markets), could allow for new forms of collective organization and alternative institutions outside of traditional democracy.
  • Innovation Stagnation and Future Strategy:

    • Research productivity faces diminishing returns; for example, the semiconductor industry now requires 18 times more engineers to achieve the same Moore's Law growth rates as in the past.
    • The US must shift from a "warfare welfare state" to an "innovation state" by reducing military and welfare spending shares in favor of R&D investment.
    • International competition (specifically with China and India) is viewed as a necessary catalyst to reignite US innovation and avoid falling behind in critical fields like biotechnology and AI.
    • Globalization expands the market for innovation, but the speaker notes that "low-hanging fruit" in past technological eras (electricity, combustion) have been exhausted, suggesting we are in a period of grind before the next quantum leap.
  • Advice for Young People:

    • 20-year-olds should pursue education in fields complementary to technology (e.g., computer science, data science, electrical engineering) rather than competing against it.
    • Skills in extracting meaning from data, causal inference, and design (combining artistic impulse with tech) are identified as high-value areas.
    • The speaker notes that the advice of older generations is becoming less useful as the world changes faster, but the "return of skill" remains a powerful trend.
Alex Tabarrok - Prizes, Prices, and Public Goods — Summary