newsfilter.io
Panel

Housing Finance and Private Capital

Panel Composition & Context

  • Panelists:
    • Gene Sperling: Director of the National Economic Council (Obama/Clinton); argues for a bipartisan framework ending the Fannie/Freddie duopoly.
    • Josh Rosner: Managing Director at Graham Fisher; criticizes Johnson-Crapo as insufficient, arguing it fails to address root causes and ignores market concentration risks.
    • Drew Newton: Managing Director at Citi; focuses on market perspective, capital availability, and the "plumbing" of the mortgage system.
    • Jim Lockhart: Former FHFA Director; oversaw the 2008 conservatorship of Fannie/Freddie; advocates for a smaller government role (30% market share) and hard-wired counter-cyclicality.
    • Don Layton: CEO of Freddie Mac (in conservatorship); notes the business model is fundamentally reliant on government support and highlights progress in multifamily private risk placement.

Legislative Landscape & Bipartisanship

  • Current Status: Five distinct bills exist across the House and Senate, with significant bipartisan momentum centered on the Corker-Warner and Crapo-Johnson frameworks.
  • Administration Stance: The Obama administration supported the Corker-Warner group to avoid politicizing the issue, stepping back to allow a "technical, behind-the-scenes" bipartisan negotiation similar to immigration reform efforts.
  • Core Consensus:
    • The current system relies on an unsustainable implicit government subsidy for a duopoly controlling housing infrastructure.
    • Reform requires a strong regulator, an explicit government backstop, and significant private capital buffers ("first loss" provisions).
    • Affordability: The White House made progress contingent on including an affordability fee to address housing access, estimated to raise nearly $5 billion annually (vs. $500 million under current constraints).

Substantive Reform Proposals & Disagreements

  • Capital & First-Loss Requirements:
    • Crapo-Johnson/Corker-Warner: Propose 5% to 10% first-loss capital, backed by an actuarial fee (up to 2.5%) and an explicit government backstop.
    • Josh Rosner (Opposition):
      • Argues the "first-loss" provision is "phantom" because the FMIC regulator can waive it during downturns, echoing the AIG bailout risk.
      • Highlights a capital shortage: A $5 trillion market with 10% first-loss requires $500 billion, whereas the entire private mortgage insurance industry holds only $7.9 billion.
      • Warns that exempting these securities from the 33 Act reduces transparency, potentially forcing reliance on "stupid money."
    • Gene Sperling (Support): Contends that 5-10% capital plus the MIF fund provides superior protection compared to the crisis era, ensuring no taxpayer bailouts.
  • Role of Regulator & Counter-Cyclicality:
    • Jim Lockhart: Warns that current legislation grants regulators too much flexibility; argues counter-cyclicality must be "hardwired" (statutory) to prevent political pressure from relaxing standards during booms.
    • Josh Rosner: Criticizes the bill for prioritizing "Mission" over "Safety and Soundness," creating a three-way conflict between capital adequacy, public purpose, and consumer protection.
    • Lockhart's Goal: Reduce government market share from the current 80% to roughly 30%, utilizing a catastrophic reinsurer only for extreme events.
  • Market Concentration & Competition:
    • Josh Rosner: Predicts that opening the market to aggregators will increase concentration (the "baby bells" effect), where small players lack scale, eventually forcing them to become third-party originators for large banks.
    • Gene Sperling: Disagrees, noting that the current 80% duopoly concentration is already a massive barrier to entry; argues that the new system's infrastructure allows for broader competition.
    • Vertical Integration Concerns: Debate exists over whether large originators (e.g., Wells Fargo, Chase) should also act as guarantors; Sperling suggests this may need further committee debate to protect community banks.

Freddie Mac Perspective (Don Layton)

  • Current Reality: The GSE business model has shifted from a "wink and nod" implicit guarantee to a system requiring massive government support; before conservatorship, earnings relied heavily on a hedge fund strategy using unsecured borrowing rather than core guarantees.
  • Private Capital Progress:
    • Freddie Mac's multifamily business already utilizes private first-loss capital (K-deals) covering >95% of risk.
    • Single-family "STACR" and Fannie's "CAS" deals demonstrate partial risk layoff is already occurring in conservatorship.
    • Prediction: Without new legislation, the GSEs will continue to shift the vast majority of risk to the private sector over the next 5–7 years.

Financial Market Outlook (Drew Newton)

  • Capital Availability: The market is concerned about the treatment of existing GSE preferred stock ($33 billion total); uncertainty here may impact future capital costs.
  • Litigation Risk: Washington's stance to litigate rather than negotiate a settlement on preferred stock creates uncertainty for large asset managers (hedge funds) considering re-entry into the mortgage market.
  • Mortgage Costs: High cost of capital or market disruption could lead to higher mortgage rates, potentially stifling the middle-class housing market.
  • Future Structure: Citi sees a role for large banks as originators, but notes that the separation of "guarantor" from "aggregator" in the new bill is a critical step toward competition.

Key Challenges to Implementation

  • "Plumbing" Deficiencies: The industry lacks modern servicing standards, data protocols, and unified securitization platforms (e.g., the Common Securitization Platform is only half-built).
  • Complexity: The single-family mortgage market is $10 trillion (comparable to the entire U.S. domestic banking system of $13–15 trillion), making it difficult to manage risk without significant regulatory oversight.
  • Timeline: Lockhart and Sperling acknowledge legislation may take 2–4 years to finalize, with the "stair-step" evolution of risk transfer continuing during the interim.