Interview, Fireside Chat
How strong is the Russian army?
- John Foreman served as Britain's Defence Attaché in Moscow from 2019 to 2022 and witnessed British Defence Minister Ben Wallace and Chief of Defence Staff Sir Tony Radkin meet with Russian counterparts Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov shortly before the 2022 invasion.
- Foreman characterizes the pre-invasion meeting as a "last ditch attempt to deter" Russia, noting that while the Russians verbally promised no invasion and offered a "carrot" of bilateral stability, the British intelligence community recognized the statements as brazen lies.
- Foreman asserts that Shoigu and Gerasimov were fully aware of the invasion plans, noting that Putin made the final decision to attack around Valentine's Day (February 14, 2022), one week prior to the full-scale invasion.
- The Russian intelligence assessment was heavily biased by "hubris, chauvinism, and racism," leading planners to view Ukrainians as "little Russians" and a "bunch of country bumpkins" who would collapse under a rapid decapitation strike.
- The invasion strategy relied on a flawed concept of "new generation warfare," aiming to destabilize Ukraine through subversion and covert action rather than large infantry formations, but failed due to catastrophic execution errors.
- Execution failures included launching four parallel thrusts without an overall commander, lacking rehearsals, suffering from out-of-date maps, and experiencing critical logistics and supply chain collapses.
- Corruption within the Russian state and military hierarchy prevented bad news regarding troop readiness, unit discipline (e.g., soldiers sitting idle and drunk at the border), and lack of supplies from reaching decision-makers.
- Foreman predicts the Russian army will rebuild as a defensive force focused on nuclear weapons rather than a modern conventional assault capability, driven by economic inferiority to Europe and the loss of its professional core.
- Foreman disputes Western forecasting that assumes Russia intends to rebuild a large conventional army for an attack on NATO, arguing that economic decline and the grievous losses in Ukraine make such an offensive strategic suicide.
- Foreman projects that European defense spending could increase to 2.5–3.5% of GDP over the next 5–10 years, adding approximately one trillion dollars to defense budgets, further widening the gap with the "creaking" Russian economy.
- Foreman concludes that even without US support, a united NATO could handle the rebuilt Russian military, as the current conflict has rendered the Russian army "more of a rabble" than a credible threat to the alliance.