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Interview

Keith Rabois on Rejoining Khosla Ventures | E1102

  • Expects to leverage social capital and the rigorous debate culture from his six years at KV to make non-standard, high-conviction decisions while carrying forward the perspectives of his former partners, including a "free education" in batteries, robotics, AI, and CRISPR that broadened his personal and investment scope.
  • Plans to invest $5 to $25 million at seed only when the capital amount is the correct dose for specific accomplishments rather than to meet a valuation expectation, and anticipates that 100% of desired seed investments can be closed if he desires, while viewing $5–$25 million checks as generally expensive and information-poor.
  • Predicts avoiding "hopping clubhouse" and similar late-stage hype, noting that he fears the Rippling investment was a missed opportunity due to lack of confidence at the valuation edge, while expecting the Ramp seed investment at a high, controversial price to yield 2x to 10x returns.
  • Expects to lead growth rounds only when a specific comparative advantage or alpha exists, such as knowledge of financial services for Stripe or science for Ultima, anticipating success for Founders Fund in growth as most other funds are price-insensitive and unable to compete.
  • Anticipates that a $400 million fund for seed is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team, whereas a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments and compete for half of the capital externally, noting that fund size must align with team composition and the "micro power law" of high-quality investors.
  • Predicts the IPO window will reopen in 2024 despite current turbulence, though success criteria now demand stronger revenue and unit economics, while forecasting 2024 as politically tumultuous with the US election outcome influencing Bitcoin's trajectory based on perceptions of the rule of law.
  • Expects to remain with Founders Fund for the foreseeable 10-year horizon, rejecting the high fixed costs and "drag coefficient" of starting his own fund, and predicts that general venture returns are weak except for the top 2-5% of firms, compelling him to pass on deals where he lacks a comparative advantage.
  • Believes that growth investing is broken due to price insensitivity and a lack of understanding of fundamental building, whereas Founders Fund's model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations.
  • Plans to avoid companies that need his capital in a way that crowds out founder muscle building, preferring to offer conceptual frameworks, and expects to introduce founders to better-suited partners like Vinod, Samir, David, or Sven when he lacks a specific comparative advantage for a deal.
  • Notes that Founders Fund is more price-sensitive and disciplined than commonly perceived, though historical discipline has relaxed at KV, Sequoia, and Founders Fund, while predicting that "hopping clubhouse" would have been a bad outcome due to his dislike for reserves and his preference for the Founders Fund model.
  • Expects that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team, while a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments and compete for half of the capital externally, noting that fund size must align with team composition and the "micro power law" of high-quality investors.
  • Predicts that he will not be a commodity and must offer a sharp, differentiated answer to why top-tier founders should take his money, while expecting that most companies are better off going public early and that Bitcoin adoption is inversely correlated to the rule of law.
  • Believes that the Founders Fund model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations, while anticipating that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team and a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments.
  • Expects that the IPO window will reopen in 2024 despite current turbulence, though success criteria now demand stronger revenue and unit economics, while forecasting 2024 as politically tumultuous with the US election outcome influencing Bitcoin's trajectory based on perceptions of the rule of law.
  • Notes that Founders Fund is more price-sensitive and disciplined than commonly perceived, though historical discipline has relaxed at KV, Sequoia, and Founders Fund, while predicting that "hopping clubhouse" would have been a bad outcome due to his dislike for reserves and his preference for the Founders Fund model.
  • Plans to avoid companies that need his capital in a way that crowds out founder muscle building, preferring to offer conceptual frameworks, and expects to introduce founders to better-suited partners like Vinod, Samir, David, or Sven when he lacks a specific comparative advantage for a deal.
  • Believes that growth investing is broken due to price insensitivity and a lack of understanding of fundamental building, whereas Founders Fund's model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations.
  • Expects that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team, while a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments and compete for half of the capital externally, noting that fund size must align with team composition and the "micro power law" of high-quality investors.
  • Predicts that he will not be a commodity and must offer a sharp, differentiated answer to why top-tier founders should take his money, while expecting that most companies are better off going public early and that Bitcoin adoption is inversely correlated to the rule of law.
  • Believes that the Founders Fund model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations, while anticipating that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team and a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments.
  • Expects that the IPO window will reopen in 2024 despite current turbulence, though success criteria now demand stronger revenue and unit economics, while forecasting 2024 as politically tumultuous with the US election outcome influencing Bitcoin's trajectory based on perceptions of the rule of law.
  • Notes that Founders Fund is more price-sensitive and disciplined than commonly perceived, though historical discipline has relaxed at KV, Sequoia, and Founders Fund, while predicting that "hopping clubhouse" would have been a bad outcome due to his dislike for reserves and his preference for the Founders Fund model.
  • Plans to avoid companies that need his capital in a way that crowds out founder muscle building, preferring to offer conceptual frameworks, and expects to introduce founders to better-suited partners like Vinod, Samir, David, or Sven when he lacks a specific comparative advantage for a deal.
  • Believes that growth investing is broken due to price insensitivity and a lack of understanding of fundamental building, whereas Founders Fund's model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations.
  • Expects that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team, while a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments and compete for half of the capital externally, noting that fund size must align with team composition and the "micro power law" of high-quality investors.
  • Predicts that he will not be a commodity and must offer a sharp, differentiated answer to why top-tier founders should take his money, while expecting that most companies are better off going public early and that Bitcoin adoption is inversely correlated to the rule of law.
  • Believes that the Founders Fund model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations, while anticipating that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team and a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments.
  • Expects that the IPO window will reopen in 2024 despite current turbulence, though success criteria now demand stronger revenue and unit economics, while forecasting 2024 as politically tumultuous with the US election outcome influencing Bitcoin's trajectory based on perceptions of the rule of law.
  • Notes that Founders Fund is more price-sensitive and disciplined than commonly perceived, though historical discipline has relaxed at KV, Sequoia, and Founders Fund, while predicting that "hopping clubhouse" would have been a bad outcome due to his dislike for reserves and his preference for the Founders Fund model.
  • Plans to avoid companies that need his capital in a way that crowds out founder muscle building, preferring to offer conceptual frameworks, and expects to introduce founders to better-suited partners like Vinod, Samir, David, or Sven when he lacks a specific comparative advantage for a deal.
  • Believes that growth investing is broken due to price insensitivity and a lack of understanding of fundamental building, whereas Founders Fund's model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations.
  • Expects that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team, while a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments and compete for half of the capital externally, noting that fund size must align with team composition and the "micro power law" of high-quality investors.
  • Predicts that he will not be a commodity and must offer a sharp, differentiated answer to why top-tier founders should take his money, while expecting that most companies are better off going public early and that Bitcoin adoption is inversely correlated to the rule of law.
  • Believes that the Founders Fund model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations, while anticipating that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team and a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments.
  • Expects that the IPO window will reopen in 2024 despite current turbulence, though success criteria now demand stronger revenue and unit economics, while forecasting 2024 as politically tumultuous with the US election outcome influencing Bitcoin's trajectory based on perceptions of the rule of law.
  • Notes that Founders Fund is more price-sensitive and disciplined than commonly perceived, though historical discipline has relaxed at KV, Sequoia, and Founders Fund, while predicting that "hopping clubhouse" would have been a bad outcome due to his dislike for reserves and his preference for the Founders Fund model.
  • Plans to avoid companies that need his capital in a way that crowds out founder muscle building, preferring to offer conceptual frameworks, and expects to introduce founders to better-suited partners like Vinod, Samir, David, or Sven when he lacks a specific comparative advantage for a deal.
  • Believes that growth investing is broken due to price insensitivity and a lack of understanding of fundamental building, whereas Founders Fund's model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations.
  • Expects that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team, while a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments and compete for half of the capital externally, noting that fund size must align with team composition and the "micro power law" of high-quality investors.
  • Predicts that he will not be a commodity and must offer a sharp, differentiated answer to why top-tier founders should take his money, while expecting that most companies are better off going public early and that Bitcoin adoption is inversely correlated to the rule of law.
  • Believes that the Founders Fund model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations, while anticipating that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team and a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments.
  • Expects that the IPO window will reopen in 2024 despite current turbulence, though success criteria now demand stronger revenue and unit economics, while forecasting 2024 as politically tumultuous with the US election outcome influencing Bitcoin's trajectory based on perceptions of the rule of law.
  • Notes that Founders Fund is more price-sensitive and disciplined than commonly perceived, though historical discipline has relaxed at KV, Sequoia, and Founders Fund, while predicting that "hopping clubhouse" would have been a bad outcome due to his dislike for reserves and his preference for the Founders Fund model.
  • Plans to avoid companies that need his capital in a way that crowds out founder muscle building, preferring to offer conceptual frameworks, and expects to introduce founders to better-suited partners like Vinod, Samir, David, or Sven when he lacks a specific comparative advantage for a deal.
  • Believes that growth investing is broken due to price insensitivity and a lack of understanding of fundamental building, whereas Founders Fund's model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations.
  • Expects that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team, while a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments and compete for half of the capital externally, noting that fund size must align with team composition and the "micro power law" of high-quality investors.
  • Predicts that he will not be a commodity and must offer a sharp, differentiated answer to why top-tier founders should take his money, while expecting that most companies are better off going public early and that Bitcoin adoption is inversely correlated to the rule of law.
  • Believes that the Founders Fund model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations, while anticipating that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team and a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments.
  • Expects that the IPO window will reopen in 2024 despite current turbulence, though success criteria now demand stronger revenue and unit economics, while forecasting 2024 as politically tumultuous with the US election outcome influencing Bitcoin's trajectory based on perceptions of the rule of law.
  • Notes that Founders Fund is more price-sensitive and disciplined than commonly perceived, though historical discipline has relaxed at KV, Sequoia, and Founders Fund, while predicting that "hopping clubhouse" would have been a bad outcome due to his dislike for reserves and his preference for the Founders Fund model.
  • Plans to avoid companies that need his capital in a way that crowds out founder muscle building, preferring to offer conceptual frameworks, and expects to introduce founders to better-suited partners like Vinod, Samir, David, or Sven when he lacks a specific comparative advantage for a deal.
  • Believes that growth investing is broken due to price insensitivity and a lack of understanding of fundamental building, whereas Founders Fund's model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations.
  • Expects that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team, while a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments and compete for half of the capital externally, noting that fund size must align with team composition and the "micro power law" of high-quality investors.
  • Predicts that he will not be a commodity and must offer a sharp, differentiated answer to why top-tier founders should take his money, while expecting that most companies are better off going public early and that Bitcoin adoption is inversely correlated to the rule of law.
  • Believes that the Founders Fund model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations, while anticipating that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team and a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments.
  • Expects that the IPO window will reopen in 2024 despite current turbulence, though success criteria now demand stronger revenue and unit economics, while forecasting 2024 as politically tumultuous with the US election outcome influencing Bitcoin's trajectory based on perceptions of the rule of law.
  • Notes that Founders Fund is more price-sensitive and disciplined than commonly perceived, though historical discipline has relaxed at KV, Sequoia, and Founders Fund, while predicting that "hopping clubhouse" would have been a bad outcome due to his dislike for reserves and his preference for the Founders Fund model.
  • Plans to avoid companies that need his capital in a way that crowds out founder muscle building, preferring to offer conceptual frameworks, and expects to introduce founders to better-suited partners like Vinod, Samir, David, or Sven when he lacks a specific comparative advantage for a deal.
  • Believes that growth investing is broken due to price insensitivity and a lack of understanding of fundamental building, whereas Founders Fund's model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations.
  • Expects that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team, while a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments and compete for half of the capital externally, noting that fund size must align with team composition and the "micro power law" of high-quality investors.
  • Predicts that he will not be a commodity and must offer a sharp, differentiated answer to why top-tier founders should take his money, while expecting that most companies are better off going public early and that Bitcoin adoption is inversely correlated to the rule of law.
  • Believes that the Founders Fund model of no explicit reserve policy and ad-hoc decisions has strong merits that avoid the pitfalls of reverse-engineering valuations, while anticipating that a $400 million fund is reasonable for a 3-5 partner team and a $1.5 billion venture fund is appropriate if the team can consume capital via pro-rata reinvestments.
  • Expects that the IPO window will reopen in 2024 despite current turbulence, though success criteria now demand stronger revenue and unit economics, while forecasting 2024 as politically tumultuous with