Sarah Paine — The war for India (Lecture & interview)

Pivotal Decisions Defining the Strategic Landscape

• China's conquest of Tibet (1950):
  • Mao Zedung decided to reconquer Tibet to secure control over 40% of China's mineral resources and the Chongqing Basin.
  • China built a critical western road network (1950–1957) providing year-round access, reducing the Himalayan buffer zone between China and India.
  • This infrastructure allowed China to deploy troops faster than India could, enabling the capture of the Aksai Chin Plateau and shifting the border dynamic permanently.
• U.S. "Pactomania" and the Northern Tier Strategy:
  • Under Eisenhower, the U.S. formed the Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan) to contain the Soviet Union and protect Middle Eastern oil fields.
  • The U.S. signed a military aid treaty with Pakistan to secure listening bases (e.g., Badaber) for U-2 surveillance of the USSR.
  • India reacted with horror, accusing the U.S. of arming an adversary that would inevitably target India; this poisoned U.S.-India relations for the duration of the Cold War.
  • Eisenhower later admitted this alliance strategy was a "terrible error" that backfired by forcing India toward the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet Split and Reshuffling of Adversaries

• Causes of the Sino-Soviet Rupture (1960):
  • Disputes over territorial concessions made by the Tsars, Stalin's refusal to let China unify (seeking a divided China like Germany/Korea), and conflicting approaches to the Korean War.
  • Mao's 1964 nuclear test removed his dependency on Soviet technical aid, allowing open ideological and strategic conflict.
  • Clashes over the Vietnamese War (Russian pincer strategy vs. Chinese influence) and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border war over the Amur River islands.
• The 1969 Border War Consequence:
  • The conflict forced a realignment where Russia and China became primary adversaries to each other, rather than sharing the U.S. as a common enemy.
  • This allowed the U.S. to pivot toward a rapprochement with China to overextend the Soviet Union.
• U.S. Strategic Calculations:
  • The Nixon administration prioritized the strategic objective of overextending Russia over intervening in the 1971 Bangladesh genocide (300,000–3 million deaths).
  • Kissinger facilitated secret trips to China to establish a strategic partnership, effectively ignoring humanitarian crises in South Asia to achieve this geopolitical goal.

Alliances, Limited Wars, and Regional Conflicts

• The Sino-Indian War (1962):
  • China launched a surprise attack during the Cuban Missile Crisis, exploiting India's lack of road infrastructure to capture the Aksai Chin Plateau.
  • The war shattered India's "non-aligned" idealism, leading to a doubling of the army size (to 750,000) and the creation of 10 mountain divisions.
  • India subsequently deepened its strategic alliance with the Soviet Union to counterbalance China.
• The 1971 Bangladesh War and Pakistan's Disintegration:
  • Pakistan's army intervened in East Pakistan to overturn election results, causing a refugee crisis that led to Indian military intervention.
  • India signed a 20-year mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971, leveraging it to veto UN resolutions calling for a cease-fire.
  • Pakistan lost East Pakistan (becoming Bangladesh), which held over half of Pakistan's population, fundamentally altering the region's demographics.
• The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War:
  • A stalemate that ended with the U.S. imposing a double arms embargo on both nations.
  • Pakistan lost military superiority and reputation, while India restored its battlefield standing.
  • Neither the U.S. nor the USSR desired the decimation of either side, leading to the Tashkent Declaration.
• The Afghan War and Proxy Warfare:
  • Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the U.S. (Carter and Reagan) funneled massive aid ($3.2 billion under Reagan) through Pakistan's ISI.
  • The U.S. suspended non-proliferation concerns to secure Pakistan as a conduit, allowing the ISI to fund anti-Western insurgents and divert resources to Kashmir.
  • This funding inadvertently contributed to the rise of Osama bin Laden and the long-term insurgency in Kashmir.

Strategic Lessons and Instruments of National Power

• The Impossibility of Dual Allyship:
  • The U.S. strategy of trying to befriend both India and Pakistan failed because any aid to one was viewed as a threat by the other.
  • Limited objectives (e.g., regime change) tend to fail in this region due to the intractability of historical grievances (Partition, Kashmir).
  • Pakistan and China share an "India problem," while Russia and India share a "China problem," creating natural, albeit limited, coalitions that the U.S. could not replicate.
• Diplomacy and Economic Aid Efficacy:
  • The 1960 Indus Water Treaty is the only successful U.S.-brokered agreement benefiting both India and Pakistan, yet it garnered no enduring gratitude.
  • U.S. economic aid (e.g., the 1967 Bihar famine relief) was often withheld or used as political leverage, reinforcing Indian skepticism of American motives.
  • Public diplomatic support (or lack thereof) significantly shapes alliances; e.g., U.S. silence on Russian invasions (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968) helped India feel secure in its non-aligned stance until 1971.
• Military Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation:
  • The U.S. attempted to use carrier battle groups (e.g., USS Enterprise in 1971) to deter India, which only angered New Delhi.
  • Sanctions and embargoes failed to stop nuclear proliferation; both India (1974, 1998) and Pakistan (1998) conducted nuclear tests despite U.S. pressure.
  • The U.S. prioritized short-term security gains (e.g., bases in Pakistan) over long-term non-proliferation, leading to a "one-way street" of nuclear spread.
• Frozen Conflicts as Strategic Tools:
  • China and Pakistan fund insurgencies (e.g., Naxalites in India, Baloch in Pakistan) to pin adversaries in place, preventing them from focusing on other strategic fronts.
  • These "frozen conflicts" impose massive opportunity costs on local populations (lack of growth, poverty) while allowing external powers to avoid direct war costs.

Forward-Looking Statements and Current Geopolitical Trends

• The Future of the Xi-Putin Alliance:
  • The "Xi-Putin bromance" is predicted to end when convenient for China; the timing is uncertain, but the dissolution is inevitable.
  • Putin's focus on Ukraine leaves Siberia open to Chinese predation regarding resources like Lake Baikal (holding 20% of the world's freshwater).
• The Second Cold War Dynamics:
  • As the U.S. and India identify China as their primary adversary, their strategic alignment is deepening, shifting the global balance away from Pakistan.
  • Russia's current war efforts are exhausting its stockpile, potentially leaving the Sino-Soviet border vulnerable to Chinese leverage.
• China's Strategic Divergence:
  • China's shift away from international order cooperation under Xi Jinping may stall its economic growth, as the regime prioritizes self-preservation over global integration.
  • Unlike the Soviet Union's collapse after economic stagnation, China's ability to maintain power relies on a complex mix of nationalism and control that may resist similar reforms.
• The Role of "Primary Adversaries":
  • Sustainable alliances are built on shared existential threats; without a common enemy (e.g., the U.S. currently lacks a primary adversary shared by any single nation), coalition building remains difficult.
  • Future strategy must account for the fact that "limited wars" (no regime change) are the norm in this region, making total victory impossible and protracted instability the likely outcome.