Sarah Paine — Why wars are so difficult to end

Core Thesis: War termination is significantly more difficult than war initiation, and success depends on distinguishing between limited objectives (achievable) and unlimited objectives (often leading to defeat or insurgency).

Russo-Japanese War as a Model:

• Japan achieved a "model" termination despite being a multi-factor inferiority to Russia in territory, population, industrial base, resources, and military size.
• Japanese Strategy: Japan aimed to remove Russia from Manchuria and secure Korea, defining a limited war objective rather than regime change.
• Operational Culmination (Attack): General Nogi's frontal assaults at Port Arthur were tactically successful but operationally wasteful, costing approximately 45,000 men (equivalent to one full Japanese army).
• Tactical Culmination Point: The capture of 203-meter Hill allowed Japanese spotters to direct heavy siege guns to sink the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, neutralizing the naval threat.
• Strategic Culmination Point (Victory): The war ended via multiple converging factors:
  • Domestic Implosion: The 1905 Russian Revolution and loss of Tsar Nicholas II's legitimacy forced a peace settlement.
  • Financial Exhaustion: Russia's credit collapsed (no new loans), while Japan secured financing as its battlefield successes lowered interest rates.
  • Naval Destruction: The Battle of Tsushima destroyed the Russian Baltic fleet, eliminating any Russian hope of continuing the war by sea.
  • Territorial Leverage: Japan captured Sakhalin Island to use as a bargaining chip in negotiations.
• Outcome: Japan secured its sphere of influence in Manchuria, the southern half of Sakhalin, and the Russian naval base, while Russia suffered massive opportunity costs that contributed to its eventual defeat in World War I and the collapse of the Romanov dynasty.

Strategic Concepts Applied:

• Culminating Point of Attack: The point where remaining strength is only sufficient for defense; exceeding it leads to disaster.
• Culminating Point of Victory: The point where the war's objective is achieved without exceeding sustainable costs; exceeding it invites third-party intervention or strategic failure.
• Decisive vs. Pivotal Battles: A decisive battle settles a war (rare); Port Arthur was "pivotal" (foreclosing options for Russia) but not decisive on its own.
• Bologna Flask Theory: A metaphor for enemy resolve; some enemies shatter under shock (Tsar Nicholas II), while others resist indefinitely (Vietnam, Ukraine).

Contrasting Case Studies:

• Gulf War (1991): A successful limited war where the US achieved clear objectives (expelling Iraq from Kuwait, restoring government, protecting lives) with minimal casualties (approx. 258 US deaths, <1,000 coalition deaths) and negligible cost (allies paid >$50 billion).
• Korean War: A failure to define limited objectives, leading to escalation.
  • Culmination Exceeded Twice: First by Kim Il-sung (invading the South triggering US intervention), and second by MacArthur (invading the North triggering Chinese intervention).
  • Result: High cost for a limited goal (preserving the South) due to the inability to isolate the theater from Chinese supply lines.
• Vietnam/Iraq/Afghanistan: Examples of "victory denial strategies" where conventional defeat fails to end the war because the enemy retreats into insurgency.
  • Value of the Object: Insurgents fight for existential survival (high value), while foreign interveners fight for lower strategic value, leading to eventual withdrawal.

Pathology 1: Regional War Escalating to Global War:

• American Revolution: Britain treated a limited colonial rebellion as an unlimited objective (regime change), prompting France, Spain, and the Netherlands to intervene, turning a regional conflict into a global one.
• World War I: Divergent objectives within alliance systems (e.g., France wanting Alsace-Lorraine, Italy wanting the Adriatic, Russia wanting the Balkans) made compromise impossible, protracting the conflict.
• Japan's Expansion: Japan's shift from limited aims in Manchuria to unlimited aims (conquering all of China) placed the Chinese on "death ground," unifying factions and inviting global intervention (US, UK, etc.).
• Pattern: Unlimited objectives and large theaters allow third parties time to intervene, often resulting in the initiator's defeat.

Pathology 2: Conventional Victory Followed by Insurgency:

• Mechanism: Defeating a state's army does not guarantee political submission; the enemy may wage a "victory denial" insurgency.
• Dilemma for Occupier: Forces must be dispersed to secure rear areas against guerrillas, weakening conventional strength against the main army, or concentrated to fight the main army, leaving rear areas vulnerable.
• Iraq Case Study: Attempting unlimited objectives (regime change) in a mosaic society with no unified national identity made state-building impossible, leading to sectarian violence and a protracted insurgency.

Forward-Looking Statements and Analytical Framework:

• Ukraine Conflict: Russia pursues an unlimited objective (regime change/annihilation), while Ukraine pursues a limited objective (sovereignty); this asymmetry suggests Ukraine will fight with higher "value of the object."
• Pre-War Assessment Criteria: Analysts must evaluate:
  • Alignment of policy objectives (limited vs. unlimited) among all actors.
  • Geographic access and the ability to close off a theater.
  • Sanctuary status of the enemy (e.g., bordering powerful allies).
  • The "value of the object" for each party (existential vs. strategic interest).
• Conclusion: Wars are best defined by their political ends (limited/unlimited) rather than the scale of military effort; unlimited objectives generally lead to stalemate or defeat unless the enemy is on "death ground."