Interview, Podcast
Stephen Kotkin: Putin, Stalin, Hitler, Zelenskyy, and War in Ukraine | Lex Fridman Podcast #289
- The third volume of Stephen Kotkin's biography of Stalin, covering World War II and the immediate post-war years, is currently in progress.
- Vladimir Putin's scale of power and death toll are considered significantly lower than Joseph Stalin's, though the current regime operates from the same locations.
- Putin's ambition to reverse the geopolitical retreat from the post-Soviet space is viewed as a delusion given Russia's current smaller size, distance from European capitals, and relative weakness compared to the West.
- The driving force behind the regime's domestic and foreign policy is identified as the "losers" from the 1990s privatization who were excluded from stealing state property.
- The regime, specifically Nikolai Patrushev, is characterized as operating on a conspiratorial belief that the West pursues a "forever campaign to destroy Russia," disregarding historical offers of integration and aid.
- The Russian economy and military face severe long-term stress due to technology export controls and the inability to replace foreign components, with domestic substitutes taking at least two years to develop.
- A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive is expected to force Putin to either acknowledge defeat or initiate a full-scale mobilization to pursue an alternative victory strategy.
- The use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine is predicted to cause fallout affecting the Kremlin and Russian border regions, rendering such a strike counterproductive to Russia itself.
- The Russian military faces a risk of disintegration if conscripts and commanders ignore or sabotage orders due to horrendous casualties and insufficient resupply.
- If the Russian military-industrial complex cannot be rebuilt due to a lack of foreign parts and microelectronics, the regime will lack a viable long-term method to sustain its war effort.
- China's strategy of using Europe as a wedge against the United States is considered compromised by Xi Jinping's alignment with Putin, potentially resulting in significant strategic costs for Beijing.
- While Kotkin explicitly declines to predict the future, he draws a parallel between current dynamics and the period leading from 1922 to the 1930s, noting that unforeseen events remain a possibility.
- Putin's departure from office is anticipated to result from reaching life expectancy (he is currently 69 or 70) or a potential coup, though no evidence of a coup currently exists as the FSO remains loyal.
- Alexei Navalny may still be alive, as the regime could view him as a potential asset to lift sanctions or appoint as a figurehead such as Prime Minister.
- A potential alternative leadership is more likely to emerge from within the current elite circle who tire of Putin's mistakes than from a popular uprising, contingent on bypassing the FSO.
- A future of prosperity and increased democracy is described as a plausible long-term horizon, comparable to the optimism held in 1922 despite the inability to foresee subsequent global crises.