Talks at GS - Dr. Richard Haass: “World Order 2.0”

Global Structural Causes of Disarray

• The primary drivers of global instability are the unprecedented dissemination of power and the acceleration of globalization.
  • Power and decision-making authority are now distributed among far more capable, autonomous actors than at any point in human history.
  • Globalization has created high-speed, large-scale flows of people, viruses, weapons, and pollutants that outpace the capacity of international governance structures.
  • A significant gap exists between these transnational flows and the existing international arrangements designed to manage them.

Regional Instability Indicators

• The Middle East is characterized as a zone of "high degree of disorder or chaos," resembling 17th-century Europe.
  • At least four states in the region are currently experiencing significant failure.
  • Syria has rendered more than half of its population homeless due to civil war and regional proxy conflicts.
• Europe is experiencing a "return of history" marked by the erosion of post-WWII stability.
  • Populism and nationalism have increased the uncertainty of election outcomes and broadened the range of potential winners.
  • The European Union faces existential uncertainty due to internal structural flaws (e.g., monetary policy without fiscal counterpart) and external pressures from the refugee crisis and Brexit.
  • Russia's intervention in Ukraine violated the fundamental international norm against using force to erase borders.
• Asia faces acute challenges regarding the accommodation of a rising China.
  • North Korea is projected to achieve the capability to place nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles reaching the continental United States during the Trump administration.

Great Power Relations and New Domains

• Great power relations are deteriorating, particularly with Russia, and potentially with China.
• Cyber warfare represents a new domain of international relations where established rules and response mechanisms remain undefined.
• Current trends are negative, with arrows pointing toward chaos rather than self-correction.

Proposed "World Order 2.0" Framework

• The 17th-century Westphalian model of sovereignty is necessary but insufficient for the 21st century.
  • While sovereignty prevents invasion, it does not address cross-border externalities created by globalization.
  • Examples of insufficient sovereignty include: domestic hacking causing global damage, unsanitary poultry farms triggering pandemics, and coal usage in one nation driving global climate change.
• The proposed solution involves an updated operational system where sovereign entities accept obligations to prevent activities within their borders from causing adverse consequences to others.
  • This framework requires negotiated rules, capacity-building for compliant states, and penalties for violators.
  • The goal is to move beyond 19th-century geopolitics to a system managing the dynamics of globalization and non-state threats.

Specific Assessment: Russia and Vladimir Putin

• Putin is described as having more freedom of action than Stalin, driven by the deinstitutionalization of Russia and the removal of checks and balances.
  • The lack of domestic constraints creates uncertainty regarding potential military action against NATO countries like Lithuania or Estonia.
• Putin's foreign policy is characterized as "revolutionary" and tactically successful in Ukraine and Syria.
  • He is driven by a desire to make Russia "perceived to be great again" rather than improving its actual economy.
  • His objectives center on securing respect and influence in the near abroad, Europe, and the Middle East.
• U.S. policy should not aim for a "friendly" relationship but rather one where Russian behavior is less destabilizing.

Specific Assessment: The Middle East

• U.S. policy must avoid two extremes: allowing the Middle East to dominate global strategy or completely disengaging from the region.
  • The region contains only 400 million people, whereas the 21st century's strategic center of gravity is shifting to Asia.
  • Complete disengagement is untenable because regional instability (terrorism, refugees, oil) does not stay local.
• Military objectives remain focused on degrading ISIS without attempting to solve the broader, insoluble Syrian conflict.
  • ISIS is expected to lose its territorial base in Mosul within months and regroup in Raqqa for a prolonged struggle.
  • Post-ISIS stabilization remains a "too hard" box issue involving complex roles for Kurds, Iran, and Sunni groups.
• Regarding Iran, the Nuclear Agreement should not be overturned despite personal reservations.
  • Unilateral withdrawal would isolate the U.S. and make recreating a sanctions regime impossible.
  • The U.S. must prepare for what follows the agreement, as quantitative limits on Iranian nuclear capabilities expire within a decade.
• The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deemed currently unsolvable; the strategic goal is limited to preventing deterioration rather than achieving a two-state solution.

Specific Assessment: Europe

• The probability of the European Monetary Union (EMU) dissolving entirely is considered low, but the composition of the bloc will likely change.
  • Europe is moving toward a "multiple Europes" model with flexible, a la carte memberships.
  • An "inner circle" regarding the monetary union will likely be maintained, led by Germany.
• The era of ambitious European integration has ended; momentum is gone and the focus is now on preservation.
  • Success is now defined as the avoidance of wide-scale dissolution rather than deeper integration.
  • The period ahead is characterized by prolonged instability and distraction at both national and EU levels.