Interview
The final filmed interview with Sir Alex Younger, the late MI6 chief | The Economist
- Sir Alex Younger concludes that as of approximately two weeks prior to his March 2026 interview, the United States has lost the strategic initiative to Iran despite a highly effective air campaign.
- Iran's resilience was achieved through pre-emptive dispersal of military capabilities and the delegation of weapon launch authority in June of the previous year.
- Iran successfully implemented "horizontal escalation" by targeting any entity within range with rockets, forcing the US to absorb direct costs.
- Iran has globalized the conflict by weaponizing the Strait of Hormuz without fully internationalizing it, leveraging the threat to global oil markets.
- The interviewee argues Iran holds the "whip hand" due to a fundamental asymmetry in the nature of the conflict:
- Iran perceives the war as a "civilizational war" for existence, providing them with greater staying power than the US or UK, which view it as a war of choice.
- Iran retains significant leverage because even 10% of its initial drone stocks are sufficient to threaten the Strait of Hormuz against oil tanker captains.
- The US and Israel cannot reduce the drone threat to zero via air power, meaning Iran can maintain a persistent blockade threat.
- Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has executed a "selective blockade" strategy that differs from previous historical conflicts:
- Unlike the complete blockades or tanker wars of the past, Iran has kept the straits open for its own shipping while blocking it for designated enemies, particularly Gulf states.
- The primary risk to maritime traffic is not landmines (which may not have been laid) but the threat of drones and rockets.
- This selective approach allows Iran to maintain revenue while simultaneously pressuring the West.
- On the nuclear program, the interviewee remains "reasonably sanguine" regarding Iran's ability to reconstitute enrichment capabilities, though he notes it remains a long-term threat.
- Western intelligence penetration is deep enough that Iran cannot rebuild its enrichment infrastructure without detection.
- Significant stockpiles of highly enriched uranium remain, particularly under rubble in Isfahan, with smaller amounts in Fordow and Natanz.
- The recent death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the appointment of his son, Mojtaba, signals a shift in leadership but not necessarily a radical change in intent.
- The political structure of the Iranian regime is described as having transitioned into a "junta" dominated by the IRGC:
- Mojtaba Khamenei is characterized as a figurehead with fewer credentials than his father, while actual power resides with pragmatic but corrupt IRGC figures like General Vahidi and Saeed Jalili.
- The IRGC acts as the guardian of the revolution rather than the state, having disempowered the regular army and benefited significantly from the black economy created by sanctions.
- The regime is in its "death throes" due to internal hatred and a lack of popular support, estimated at 80% opposition among the population.
- However, the ongoing war provides the regime with a "lease of life" by creating a security environment that suppresses internal opposition and justifies increased brutality.
- The US intelligence community is facing a crisis of politicization under the Trump administration:
- Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard is reported to have refused to contradict President Trump's assertions about Iran's imminent threat in Congressional testimony.
- Younger warns that allowing intelligence to be shaped by a leader's desires, rather than speaking "truth to power," creates a high risk of intelligence failure, citing the October 7 Hamas attack as a precedent.
- While US technical and human intelligence capabilities remain "astonishing," the current culture of demoralization and fear of repercussions for dissent is damaging.
- In contrast to the US intelligence community, Younger notes that Israeli intelligence has achieved exceptional success due to a narrow, laser-like focus on specific regional adversaries rather than global responsibilities.
- The Israeli campaign demonstrated high proficiency in tracking leadership, hacking surveillance systems, and exfiltrating nuclear archives.
- Gulf states face a difficult strategic dilemma and a potential erosion of trust with the United States:
- Gulf leaders feel the US failed to support them adequately during the 2011 Arab Spring, a memory that will persist within ruling families.
- While they are flirting with China and Russia to hedge their bets (e.g., selling oil in yuan), they remain militarily dependent on US air defenses.
- Younger predicts the likely end state for Iran resembles the period between the First and Second Gulf Wars: "down but not out," retaining the capacity for asymmetric threats.
- Future diplomatic outcomes may be constrained by the current balance of power and US domestic politics:
- The US may struggle to achieve a favorable settlement, potentially having to offer sanctions relief and security guarantees against future attacks.
- President Trump may attempt to "wrench" terms in his favor by threatening attacks on power plants or seizing Hormuz's Kharg Island, though this carries risks of war crimes or escalation.
- A "declared victory" by the US is a possibility, but Younger doubts complete military victory is achievable solely through air power.
- The war has highlighted fault lines in the US-Europe alliance, leading Younger to urge Europe to develop its own "hard power" capabilities:
- He argues Europe has been "infantilized" by outsourcing security to the US and that the Trump era necessitates a reevaluation of this dependency.
- Younger believes a stronger European defense posture would actually improve the relationship with the US by making European nations "useful" partners.
- Maintaining the intelligence relationship requires guarding against politicization while accepting that national interests must sometimes diverge.
- The conflict has significant global spillover effects that converge on great power competition:
- The war diverts US military resources and munitions away from the Pacific theater, indirectly benefiting China's long-term strategic position.
- Russia stands to benefit from increased oil sales revenue and access to advanced drone and targeting intelligence from Iran.
- There is a shortage of air defense interceptors for Ukraine due to the prioritization of the Middle East.
- Younger asserts that while the war itself may not spread geographically, the second- and third-order consequences will be international and damaging to global security stability.