Jun 12, 2025, 12:43 PM ETInterview

The Graph That Explains Most of Geopolitics Today | Professor Hugh White

The US-led unipolar order, unique in its duration and scope, is ending due to rising costs and risks outweighing benefits for the US.
The primary driver of this shift is the resurgence of Russia and China as great powers, not merely the presidency of Donald Trump.
A multipolar world with multiple regional spheres of influence is presented as the stable alternative, though it is harder to manage than the previous unipolar era.
The US is already strategically withdrawing from its global leadership role by failing to back up rhetorical commitments with military capability.
The "cost-benefit arithmetic" for US leadership no longer works because the US cannot sustain a role where the risks exceed the strategic value.

US isolationism in the 19th century was a rational strategy based on secure borders and a European balance of power that prevented any single Eurasian hegemon.
The US abandoned isolationism in 1914 because the European balance of power collapsed, creating a risk of German dominance over Eurasia.
A dominant Eurasian power would possess sufficient strength to project power against the US Western Hemisphere, threatening national security.
During the Cold War, the US successfully contained the Soviet Union because both sides possessed the resolve to risk nuclear war to defend their respective spheres.
Post-Cold War US interventionism was driven by the perception that leadership was "cheap" because rivals were non-existent or democratic.
The 1990s saw a belief that China and Russia would naturally accept US leadership as part of the global market-democratic model.
The risk of nuclear war, dormant after the Cold War, has returned to the center of strategic calculation due to conflicts in Ukraine and the Pacific.

China began overtly challenging US leadership in East Asia around 2010, a period where the US failed to build the necessary military capabilities to push back.
In the Western Pacific, China has closed the capability gap to the point where the US cannot win a conventional war in the region.
The US has not explained to the American public why defending East Asia requires accepting the risk of nuclear war, leading to a lack of political consensus.
China is transitioning from a technology taker to a technology creator, with domestic research spending trending higher than in the West.
Strategic asymmetries favor China in a potential conflict: it fights for its backyard while the US fights globally; China controls the defense; and China cares more about the region.
The US cannot "win" by occupying Beijing or rebuilding China's political system, as it lacks the will to risk nuclear retaliation for such a total victory.
Even if the Chinese economy were to flatline, its current size (measured by PPP) and industrial base would still make challenging the US prohibitively costly.
China's ability to deny the US a conventional victory in the Western Pacific means the US must choose between fighting a war it cannot win or accepting Chinese regional dominance.

Russia has successfully asserted a sphere of influence in Ukraine, demonstrating the US willingness to tolerate territorial changes to avoid nuclear escalation.
The US failed to credibly deter Russia after 2014 by deploying only token forces rather than significant conventional armies.
The US cannot credibly threaten nuclear retaliation for Ukraine because Ukraine is not viewed as worth a nuclear exchange.
Joe Biden's 2021 statement that "America will not fight World War III in Ukraine" confirmed the lack of resolve to use nuclear weapons in defense of Ukraine.
Europe faces a dilemma: without the US nuclear umbrella, it must either acquire its own nuclear weapons or concede to Russian coercion.
A cohesive European strategic entity with independent nuclear capabilities is a "tall order" but preferable to individual European nuclear proliferation.
Europe must increase defense spending to approximately 3% of GDP to develop credible conventional forces capable of blocking Russian advances without nuclear threats.
Individual European powers (like Poland) acquiring their own nuclear weapons is a likely outcome if a collective European deterrent fails.

Australia: Should stop relying on US security guarantees, increase defense spending, and build a force designed to stop power projection rather than support US global ops.
Japan: Will likely need its own nuclear weapons to ensure independence from China, despite historical constraints.
South Korea: Faces increased vulnerability to North Korean nuclear blackmail; acquiring its own nuclear weapons is considered the only viable option.
European Allies: Must "indigenize" military production to reduce dependency on US technology that can be cut off, such as F-35 software updates.
Middle Powers: Should adopt a strategy of "playing off" competing great powers (e.g., balancing US, China, and India) rather than aligning exclusively with one.
Southeast Asia: Countries in the region must learn to balance China and India, as they lack the collective security structures seen in Europe.

Taiwan: Is strategically indefensible against China; the most probable Chinese strategy is blockade rather than amphibious invasion.
The Chip Factor: The US should not fight a war for Taiwan's chips; a better strategy is to ensure the destruction of Taiwan's fabs to deny China access.
US Credibility: The US must be honest with Taiwan that it will not provide military support, as encouraging false hope is more dangerous than the truth.
Baltic States: Similar to Ukraine, Europe may eventually concede these regions to Russia if they cannot credibly threaten nuclear retaliation.
Poland: Representing the gateway to Germany, Poland is the critical line where Europe must decide to stop Russian expansion, potentially requiring Polish nuclear weapons.

AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) could be transformational but is unlikely to provide a decisive strategic advantage sufficient to neutralize nuclear weapons.
Even if the US develops AGI first, China would retain the capacity to inflict massive damage on the US with existing nuclear weapons.
The "first-strike" strategy for AGI is risky because it might prompt China to launch a preemptive attack out of fear of being disarmed.
The US political system lacks the capacity to execute a "Manhattan Project" style mobilization for AGI or conventional warfare.
The US is unlikely to go to war for AGI dominance because the imperative to maintain global hegemony no longer exists for national survival.

US foreign policy elites are still in denial, pretending to be serious about preserving primacy while taking no action to support it.
Realism dictates that countries only fight major wars when their own security and survival are at stake, not primarily for moral values.
The American Civil War is cited as the primary historical exception where a major war was fought for moral purposes (slavery) despite high costs.
The US does not need global leadership to remain a powerful, secure state; it can thrive as a major power within a multipolar order.
The US should "let go" of the unipolar vision and focus on building a manageable multipolar order where it plays a constructive role.
The alternative to a managed multipolar order is a world of escalating strategic rivalry between nuclear-armed great powers, which carries a higher risk of nuclear war.