Thomas Dyja, author of "New York, New York, New York"

Thomas Deidja's New York, New York covers the period from Ed Koch to Michael Bloomberg (late 1970s–2013) to move beyond binary discourses of gentrification vs. neoliberalism and policing vs. crime.

The book's core thesis traces how technology and data shifted from non-existent to foundational in city management, changing how New York "thought about itself."

• Under Abe Beame, the city suffered a "control crisis" with no auditable budget, no computerized systems, and a lack of basic employee data (e.g., a deputy mayor presenting hand-scribbled figures).
• Re-entry into credit markets required the federal government and banks to mandate a computerized budget system.
• Deputy Mayor John Zuccotti created the Mayor's Management Report, forcing departments to issue bi-annual data books, ending the era of manual record-keeping.
• Computerization reduced city mapping time from 30 hours to one hour, enabling sanitation departments to identify crime and service "hot spots."
• Under Giuliani, Jack Maple and Bill Bratton transformed police data from annual reports to weekly CompStat meetings, shifting to daily accountability.
• Michael Bloomberg expanded data usage into "creative solutions" for previously unrecognized urban problems.

Ed Koch is characterized as a larger-than-life figure who rebuilt the city fiscally but suffered significant policy blind spots.

• Koch's administration failed to adequately address the AIDS crisis, with the author noting "nothing not a lot was done that could have been done."
• Koch displayed deep racial blind spots, notably shutting down Sydenham Hospital to make a fiscal statement, which cleaved racial structures and devastated minority communities.
• A major legacy of the Koch-Cuomo administration was the "housing initiative," which connected communities with land and building capital, described as having the "greatest impact on the city in more different ways" than other programs.

David Dinkins is framed as a transitional mayor whose successes were often inherited rather than ideologically driven.

• The administration featured a friction between bureaucrat Norman Stiesel and political operator Bill Lynch.
• The murder of Brian Watkins at the U.S. Open catalyzed the "Safe Streets, Safe Kids" legislation, which funded the police force Giuliani later utilized.
• Dinkins's term concluded amidst a perception of the city as a "dead" place (referencing the Time magazine cover), failing to overcome the rising crime rates and social unrest.

Rudy Giuliani's trajectory shifted from a "white hat" reformer to a polarizing political operator.

• In the late 1980s, Giuliani gained traction by prosecuting Wall Street corruption, the Mafia (Pizza Connection), and Leona Helmsley.
• Upon winning the 1993 election, he strategically "tacked right" against Dinkins, utilizing campaign manager Jackie Mason and the "one city, one standard" mantra to capitalize on cultural panics regarding multiculturalism and political correctness.
• Giuliani's first term saw crime collapse and a cultural reawakening, but his second term was marred by the weaponization of ideas and an "enormous toll on people of color."
• The author argues Giuliani's tenure established a legacy of using data and policy as tools of social control rather than community enhancement.

Michael Bloomberg entered office as an unexpected independent candidate following the exhaustion of the Giuliani era and the trauma of 9/11.

• Bloomberg's career as mayor is noted for defying traditional party lines, as he operated as a Republican, Democrat, and Independent.
• The stability of these transitions is attributed to a class of "faceless bureaucrats" (e.g., Nat Levinthal, Harvey Robbins) who provided continuity across changing political administrations.

The COVID-19 pandemic is identified as a unique challenge to New York because it prevents the face-to-face human interaction essential to urban vitality.

• The city's current state of empty streets resembles the pre-1970s experience, contrasting with 9/11 where physical proximity and communal hugging were survival mechanisms.
• The author cites urbanist William H. Whyte's thesis that "cities exist to facilitate face-to-face exchange" and that "people were the answer to everything."
• The inability to rely on human density to solve crime and social issues during the pandemic represents a fundamental departure from the city's historical problem-solving model.