Conference Presentation, Panel, Fireside Chat
When Past Performance Is a Guide: Using History to Make Sense of the Post-Crisis World
Milken InstituteDaniel Arbess, Ben Funnell, Mitchell Julis, Peter Thiel, Niall Ferguson, Mitch Julis
Panelists and Core Premise
- The panel features Dan Arbus (Xerion/Perella Weinberg), Ben Funnell (GLG/Mann Group), Mitch Julis (Canyon Partners), and Peter Thiel (Clarium/Founders Fund).
- The central thesis questions whether current post-crisis economic conditions mirror historical precedents, specifically the 1930s, or represent a unique divergence.
Peter Thiel: Technology as the Critical Variable
- Thiel argues the 1930s were a "miraculous" decade for science and technology (secondary oil recovery, plastics, aerospace, household appliances) that allowed for massive money printing without inflation.
- He posits that the current era lacks a comparable "technological tailwind" to offset the Bernanke-era monetary expansion, distinguishing the present from the 1930s.
- Thiel identifies the "fracking revolution" as the modern analogue to 1930s secondary oil recovery, suggesting that if successful, it could validate current monetary policies; if exaggerated, it risks a third bubble in three decades.
- Skepticism is raised regarding fracking due to oil prices remaining above 2003 levels, implying that if technology truly reduces cost, prices should be lower ($100/barrel vs. $25 in the 90s).
- Thiel contends that outside of IT, technological innovation has slowed significantly over the last 40 years, citing a one-third drop in FDA drug approvals and the failure of agricultural yield growth (the "green revolution").
- He warns of a "Malthusian" return for developed nations if technological progress stalls, as demographics alone cannot sustain long-term growth.
- Thiel identifies a structural "stationary state" risk in the US and Europe caused by regulatory restraints and a loss of faith in the future, contrasting this with the dynamic innovation environment of the 1930s.
- The "disappearance of the future" is cited as a critical psychological risk, with 80% of Americans believing the next generation will be worse off, potentially leading to a substitution of leisure for work.
- Long-term investment horizons (20–30 years) are described as being out of favor even within venture capital, which now prioritizes traction within 18–24 months.
Mitch Julis: Complexity Economics and Historical Frameworks
- Julis advocates for a "complexity economics" framework over neoclassical finance, emphasizing nonlinear feedback loops (overshoot, collapse, oscillation) rather than equilibrium models.
- Key drivers of historical wealth explosions identified include germ theory (extending longevity) and social technology shifts (women entering the workforce post-WWII).
- Julis notes that the labor force expansion in the US is now a headwind rather than a tailwind due to demographic shifts and declining participation rates.
- He highlights the Euro mechanism as a historical phenomenon where ethnic and religious differences are "papered over" to avoid the memory and ghosts of past wars.
- Julis suggests that managing risk in complex systems requires focusing on "return of capital" (safety) alongside "return on capital" (growth), combining the philosophies of Will Rogers and Albert Einstein.
Ben Funnell: The Euro and German Historical Psychology
- Funnell counters the narrative that Germany might abandon the Euro, citing German historical education's obsession with National Socialism as a driver of unwavering commitment to the Euro project.
- Polling data indicates 65% of Germans approved of the Euro, suggesting the currency union will likely remain intact despite structural flaws.
- If the Euro holds, Funnell predicts a reversal of 2000s dynamics: Germany will face inflation and negative real bond yields as its interest rates converge with Southern European levels.
- This macro environment creates a specific investment thesis for German real estate as a hedge against future inflation within the currency union.
- Funnell links the 2008 crisis genesis to income inequality, noting that the bottom two income quintiles accumulated disproportionate debt when earnings stagnated.
Dan Arbus: The Making of History and Policy Risks
- Arbus views history primarily as a heuristic but argues the most critical insights come from "making history"—moments where historical patterns fail to predict outcomes.
- He notes the 2007–2009 financial crisis initially tracked the 1930s Great Depression closely before diverging, largely due to Ben Bernanke's application of Great Depression lessons (aggressive monetary intervention).
- Arbus warns that the recovery is incomplete due to a lack of fiscal stimulus, noting that 93% of wealth recovery has accrued to the top 1% while housing wealth remains significantly depressed ($5 trillion gap).
- He identifies a policy "trilemma": the inability to use fiscal policy due to political austerity debates and the diminishing returns of monetary policy (Quantitative Easing) as money supply growth remains anemic.
- Arbus introduces the concept of "overt monetary finance" (helicopter money) as a theoretical solution to bypass blocked fiscal channels, proposing direct Fed-to-government capital transfers funded by inflation targets rather than debt issuance.
- He critiques the current regulatory environment, arguing that excessive red tape and time delays (e.g., construction projects taking 8 years vs. 3.5 years in the 1930s) are preventing capital from generating high returns in the real economy.
Global Trends and Divergences
- The panel identifies the "Great Divergence" (1500–1978) followed by a "Great Reconvergence" as the defining historical trend of the last century, with US per capita GDP relative to China dropping from 22:1 to 5:1.
- Projections suggest this ratio will fall below 2:1 by mid-century, driven by emerging markets catching up through technology appropriation.
- Thiel and Arbus disagree on the speed and sustainability of this growth; Arbus believes the US remains the most dynamic economy due to energy innovation and housing recovery, while Thiel worries about long-term stagnation.
- China's primary concern is identified as the social and political consequences of rapid growth, with leadership studying Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the Revolution to anticipate unrest.
- A "duration mismatch" is highlighted as a key investment risk: capital is allocated by institutions with short-term return requirements to assets that require long-term horizons to realize value.
- Future investment opportunities are pointed toward specific "leverage points" for discontinuous wealth creation, such as New York's planned innovation cluster (Cornell/Technion on Roosevelt Island).
Forward-Looking Statements and Decisions
- Inflation vs. Deflation: Thiel anticipates a scenario of "low inflation" or "retroflation" (rising asset prices, falling wages) rather than hyperinflation or deflation.
- Real Rates: The market pricing of 10-year real rates at -0.6% is interpreted by Thiel as evidence that "Einsteinian economics" (compounding wealth) may be broken, implying investors should be ecstatic with returns above the negative baseline.
- Fiscal Policy: Arbus argues that without a shift to direct monetary financing or renewed fiscal stimulus, the US economy will remain mired in a balance sheet recession with slow employment recovery.
- Demographics: Demographic headwinds (retiring baby boomers) are projected to reduce US GDP growth from ~2% to ~0.8% over the next decade, even if technology remains constant.
- Investment Strategy: The consensus leans toward preparing for complexity by prioritizing capital preservation ("return of money") and seeking non-linear growth opportunities in innovation clusters rather than relying on broad macroeconomic stimulus.