Why pleasure & pain are the only things that intrinsically matter | Sharon Hewitt Rawlette (2022)

Core Thesis: Moral Realism Grounded in Consciousness

• Sharon Hewitt Rawlett proposes a form of moral realism where intrinsic goodness is an experiential property of conscious states (phenomenal consciousness).
• Intrinsic value is not a separate property supervening on experience but is identical to the qualitative nature of positive experiences (pleasure, joy) and negative experiences (pain, suffering).
• Positive qualia possess an intrinsic property of "ought to be-ness," while negative qualia possess an intrinsic property of "ought not to be-ness."
• This theory solves the epistemological gap in morality: we know moral facts directly through acquaintance with our own subjective experiences rather than via abstract reasoning or causal interaction with external facts.
• Rawlett argues that without experiencing pleasure and pain, humans would not possess the concept of intrinsic goodness required for moral decision-making.

Metaethical Distinctions and Definitions

• Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value:
  • Intrinsic/Terminal Value: Things valuable in and of themselves (e.g., pleasure, happiness) due to their own properties.
  • Instrumental Value: Things valuable only as means to an end (e.g., money, knowledge, beauty, relationships) because they produce intrinsic good.
• Propositional vs. Direct Value:
  • Direct acquaintance involves feeling the goodness of a sensation (e.g., the taste of food).
  • Propositional value involves evaluating a claim (e.g., "killing is wrong") by inspecting the feelings associated with the act.
• Personhood vs. Experience:
  • Describing a "good person" typically refers to instrumental goodness (a person conducive to good outcomes) rather than the direct experience of value.
• Personal Identity:
  • Rawlett adopts a reductive view of personal identity (influenced by Derek Parfit), arguing that boundaries between individuals are vague and not morally significant.
  • This undermines Egoistic Hedonism: if identity is not a deep metaphysical fact, the intrinsic badness of pain is not limited to "me"; the pain of others is just as objectively bad as my own.

Evidence for a Unified Axis of Value

• Neuroscientific Evidence:
  • Research by affective neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp indicates shared neural pathways for physical and emotional pain (e.g., the periaqueductal gray and anterior cingulate cortex).
  • Treatments for physical pain (endorphins, oxytocin) also reduce social distress and separation anxiety in animals, suggesting a common physiological basis for negative affect.
• Behavioral Evidence (Cabanac's Experiments):
  • Michel Cabanac's research demonstrates that humans can make trade-offs between qualitatively different sensations (e.g., physical pain vs. social loneliness).
  • These trade-offs reflect an algebraic summation of ratings, implying the brain calculates a "cardinal value" on a single scale, which Rawlett attributes to a common phenomenological property.
• Commensurability:
  • Rawlett argues against qualitative incommensurability (e.g., Mill's "higher" vs. "lower" pleasures), suggesting that if people consistently choose one over the other, they must be comparing them on a shared scale.
  • She posits that differences in preference often stem from a lack of capacity to experience certain types of pleasure (e.g., intellectual vs. base) rather than an inherent hierarchy of value.

Responses to Major Objections

• The Experience Machine (Nozick):
  • Rawlett counters that the intuition against plugging into the machine relies on practical instrumental concerns (safety, agency, trust) rather than the intrinsic value of reality.
  • In a hypothetical scenario where the machine is perfectly safe, all external facts are known, and the machine produces infinite well-being, hedonistic utilitarianism would recommend plugging in.
  • Real-world analogs (video games, sleep) show humans already disconnect from reality for pleasure without viewing it as morally wrong, provided agency is restored.
• Non-Hedonic Intuitions (Relationships, Truth, Beauty):
  • Rawlett argues that intuitions about the intrinsic value of truth or relationships are often "perspectival biases" or evolved heuristics for instrumental value.
  • She suggests we blur the line between instrumental and intrinsic value because these things are consistently correlated with positive outcomes over evolutionary time.
  • Believing relationships are intrinsically valuable can be instrumentally useful for maintaining long-term commitment during difficult periods.
• Representation vs. Directness:
  • Critics argue pleasure is a representation of value rather than value itself. Rawlett counters that states like "euphoria" or "dread" can exist without an object, proving they are non-representational qualities of consciousness.
  • The internal character of the experience is what allows it to represent instrumental goodness; the experience itself is the good.
• The "Trolley Problem" (Organ Harvesting):
  • Rawlett argues that utilitarianism does not actually recommend killing one healthy person to save five in this specific scenario.
  • Uncertainty: We cannot guarantee the success of the transplants or the lack of negative societal side effects.
  • Coordination: Secretly violating bodily autonomy destroys trust in the medical system, leading to worse overall health outcomes (e.g., people avoiding hospitals).
  • Motivational Limitations: A system allowing organ harvesting would incentivize people to neglect their own health, increasing overall suffering.
  • Rawlett notes that if the numbers were large enough (e.g., saving one hundred lives), the utilitarian calculus might shift, revealing that our intuitions align with consequentialist reasoning when fully accounted for.

Practical Implications of Hedonistic Utilitarianism

• Decision-Making Under Uncertainty:
  • Due to limited information, optimal decision-making involves "rules of thumb" based on the single factor most correlated with outcomes (Gerd Gigerenzer's research).
  • This makes utilitarian practice converge with deontological rules (e.g., "do not murder") in nearly all real-world contexts.
• The Need for Coordination:
  • Society functions better when individuals follow predictable rules; this requires autonomy and respect for rights to ensure coordination.
  • This provides a utilitarian justification for liberalism and individual rights, as they maximize the ability of individuals to produce good outcomes for themselves and others.
• Motivational Limitations:
  • Humans are most motivated to help those close to them (perspectival bias).
  • A society that forces individuals to act solely on impartial utility would fail because people cannot effectively manage the welfare of distant strangers.
  • Therefore, it is utilitarian to allow spheres of personal autonomy where individuals prioritize their own well-being.

Forward-Looking Statements and Future Research

• Future of Pain and Motivation:
  • Rawlett speculates that future technology might eliminate suffering by replacing negative pain signals with "withdrawal of bliss," though she remains skeptical that the absence of pleasure is as motivating as the presence of pain.
• Synthetic Pleasure:
  • She explores the theoretical possibility of creating machines that generate limitless pleasure, acknowledging that human intuitions may fail to recognize the value of such states.
  • If such machines could communicate their internal states, the moral intuition against them might diminish as empathy for their "sentience" increases.
• Next Work:
  • Rawlett is developing a follow-up book to integrate moral realism with contemporary philosophy of mind, specifically investigating the causal efficacy of qualia.
  • She proposes that normative qualia (pleasure/pain) are causally efficacious, meaning the "badness" of pain directly causes avoidance behavior, challenging epiphenomenalist views of consciousness.
• Causal Efficacy of Value:
  • The theory suggests that moral facts are causally efficacious because they are properties of consciousness, which in turn drives behavior.
  • This aligns with process philosophy (Alfred North Whitehead) and modern panpsychism, offering a solution to the traditional "causal exclusion" problem in ethics.