Confronting Terrorism at Home and Abroad

Current Threat Landscape

• The U.S. faces a diverse array of terrorist threats involving more threats from more places than at any time since 9/11.
• Nick Schifrin (former NCTC Director) notes that while the threat environment is more complex due to the ISIS model, the U.S. is better positioned than immediately post-9/11 due to improved capabilities.
• Al-Qaeda remains a top-tier, persistent counterterrorism concern despite ISIS dominating headlines and the extremist narrative.
• The current threat matrix includes:
  • Centralized, directed threats (traditional al-Qaeda model).
  • ISIS-enabled threats (individuals with some training or capacity building).
  • ISIS-inspired threats (individuals with no direct contact, training, or organizational ties).
• The "homegrown violent extremist" (HVE) model is the most likely threat within the U.S., characterized by individuals acting alone with lower capability but significant difficulty in detection.
• European partners face a more lethal and complex threat environment involving individuals directly organized and deployed by ISIS, unlike the U.S. which faces more "inspired" attackers.

Kinetic Operations in Iraq and Syria

• Mosul, Iraq:
  • The Iraqi Defense Forces chief projected the liberation of West Mosul by Ramadan; the operation began in early February after East Mosul's liberation.
  • Iraqi officials estimate 50% to 80% of West Mosul is liberated, with fighting expected to continue street-by-street.
  • Approximately 400,000 civilians remain trapped in West Mosul, necessitating a slow, deliberate pace to minimize civilian casualties.
  • The Iraqi government retains full ownership of the fight, with the U.S. and 68 coalition entities (65 countries) providing support.
  • Future operations will target Tal Afar, Qawija, and the Euphrates River Valley.
• Raqqa, Syria:
  • The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), comprising YPG Kurds and Sunni Arab Coalition, launched an isolation operation in late November 2017.
  • On March 21, the SDF completed an air and rubber raft movement around the south side of the Tabqa Dam, completing the isolation of Raqqa.
  • The campaign involves three phases: north-to-south, west-to-east, and east-side operations.
• Strategic Shift:
  • The campaign relies on a "by, with, and through" partner model, a significant departure from the decade-long period where the U.S. owned the fight.
  • Linda Robinson notes the campaign has suffered from slow momentum in the first 18 months due to insufficient advisors, air assets, intelligence, and enablers.
  • The U.S. now provides artillery, HIMARS, and Apache helicopters to support partner forces.

Political and Geopolitical Challenges

• Turkey Factor:
  • Turkey has threatened to expel humanitarian workers (e.g., Mercy Corps) and expressed hostility toward the SDF's Kurdish presence.
  • President Erdogan's visit to Washington on May 15 is deemed critical to resolving tensions and preventing a diplomatic or military conflict with a key NATO ally.
  • Turkey likely lacks the military capability to operate in the Raqqa area but remains a geopolitical constraint.
• Governance in Northeast Syria:
  • Brian Fishman identifies the governance of northeastern Syria as a "tough nut to crack" due to ethnic discord between the YPG/SDF and the local Sunni Arab population.
  • Establishing sustainable local governance structures (e.g., civilian councils) is a prerequisite for transitioning from war to law enforcement.
• Post-Conflict Reconstruction:
  • Terry Meeuwsen warns that expectations for immediate stability post-Mosul are unrealistic; a prolonged transition period is required.
  • Iraq has received $2.3 billion in humanitarian pledges (July) and another $2.6 billion (March) for reconstruction, primarily focusing on IDP support and demining.
  • Reconstruction will likely require loans rather than grants, with governance structures evolving through provincial and national elections.

Long-Term Resiliency and Ideology

• ISIS Resurgence History:
  • Brian Fishman notes ISIS declared a state in 2006 and was considered "defeated" by U.S. forces in 2010, yet suicide attacks in 2008-2010 were higher than in any other country.
  • The organization possesses a "latent" capability to operate underground as a covert terrorist and criminal entity even without territorial control.
• Ideological Arguments:
  • Territorial loss is expected to discredit ISIS for "joiner" recruits, but ideological arguments persist (e.g., claiming more territory than the Prophet Muhammad held in Medina).
  • ISIS rejects modern concepts of sovereignty to justify its legitimacy and continued relevance.
• Global Nature of the Threat:
  • The fight is global, extending to eight ISIS branches and affiliates in locations like the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Tunisia.
  • The threat will persist as long as local political and security dynamics (e.g., in South Asia) remain unresolved.

Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Administration

• Administrative Shifts:
  • The Trump administration demonstrates a bias for empowering cabinet departments to act energetically with less interagency friction.
  • Strategic continuity exists with previous administrations regarding the principle of "not owning the problem" and building capable local partners to avoid draining national wealth.
  • Nick Schifrin argues that the solution requires a "Goldilocks" approach: not billions in aid or hundreds of thousands of troops, but sufficient stabilization and targeted support.
• Technology and Intelligence:
  • The intelligence community faces a "going dark" challenge due to widespread encryption, limiting current situational awareness.
  • Brian Fishman (Facebook) notes that over 50% of removed terror content is identified proactively via machine learning, though human review remains essential for context (e.g., distinguishing counter-speech from propaganda).
  • Facebook sponsors the "Peer to Peer" program in 500 universities to scale counter-extremism messaging locally.
• Financial Warfare:
  • ISIS raised state-like revenue through taxation, oil/gas sales, extortion, and kidnapping, unlike traditional al-Qaeda.
  • The U.S. employs a kinetic campaign against oil infrastructure and financial institutions, alongside cutting off access to the international financial system.
  • Revenue breakdown in core ISIS areas: ~30% from oil/gas, ~50% from extortion, ~20% from other sources.

Specific Policy Issues

• Southern Border:
  • No significant terrorist threat is currently associated with the U.S.-Mexico southern border; it is primarily a domestic political issue.
• Budgetary Priorities:
  • Proposals to cut State Department and USAID funding are viewed as misaligned with the long-term requirements for stabilization and governance.
  • A lack of MQ-9 armed UAVs is identified as a critical constraint on the speed of the counterterrorism campaign.
• Afghanistan:
  • General Nicholson requested 3,000–5,000 additional troops for counterterrorism and training roles.
  • Success in South Asia is limited by regional political dynamics beyond U.S. control.

Future Outlook

• The U.S. must maintain patience, as solving the terrorist problem is non-linear and will lag behind territorial gains.
• Stabilization activities must extend well beyond the proposed six-month window to address the displacement of 3 million Iraqis and 11 million Syrians.
• A "come to Jesus" moment is required for the American public to recognize the danger of terrorism without allowing fear to dominate national security perceptions.
• The transition from military operations to law enforcement governance in Iraq and Syria is the ultimate metric of success, requiring robust international cooperation and local buy-in.