Interview
Kaja Kallas: can the European Union survive in an era of strongmen?
- Chinese government representatives anticipate that ending the Ukraine war will redirect U.S. strategic focus toward China, potentially acting against Beijing's interests, while leadership plans to frame their stance as beneficial to mitigate domestic unpopularity regarding the conflict.
- Japanese think tanks project the war remains unpopular in China, necessitating justifications for the country's position, while analyst Kaya Kalas suggests China may tolerate civilian casualties and urban destruction if it advances national self-interest.
- European capacity to counter Chinese economic coercion, export controls, or support for Russia is projected to remain limited without unity among the 27 EU member states, as the bloc lacks the political will to use existing counter-coercion tools.
- Kaya Kalas plans to build partnerships with Indo-Pacific, Latin American, and African nations to diversify supply chains and reduce dependency on superpowers, though this process is expected to be slow and likely should have begun prior to current conditions.
- Reliance on Chinese critical raw materials, electric batteries, ships, and electric vehicles is identified as a significant source of economic power concerns, with analysts warning that superpowers often overestimate their own strength while underestimating the need for cooperation.
- Predictions indicate that geopolitical outcomes will depend on the actions and choices of current leaders, as the evolution of the situation is described as "on us," contrasting with the perceived predictability of Russian and Chinese leaders who have openly pursued "changes not foreseen in 100 years" since at least 2007.
- Analysts warn that many leaders previously failed to anticipate the war due to analyzing events through a "democratic lens," leading to underestimation of the resolve of non-democratic actors who have maintained clear, open, and predictable objectives.
- The EU's decision-making structure involving 27 democracies with domestic issues is expected to result in slower timelines compared to one-person executive orders, reinforcing challenges in maintaining unity and certainty regarding backup options for inflicting reciprocal pain.