Key lessons from five months of war in Ukraine | Samuel Charap (2022)

Current Military Situation and Russian Strategy (as of July 21)

• Russia has shifted its strategic focus from a failed attempt to capture Kyiv to a concentrated effort on the Donbas region (Luhansk and Donetsk).
• Russian forces now control the entirety of Luhansk and most of Donetsk, despite these areas being heavily fortified by Ukraine over an eight-year period.
• Russia retains control over significant portions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, using them as logistical corridors and supply lines for the eastern offensive.
• Ukraine is preparing for a counter-offensive in the south to retake Kherson, though analysts question whether Ukrainian combined arms capabilities are sufficient to push back Russian forces.
• Russia has moved away from its initial "3-day war" plan, now utilizing its traditional strength in artillery and tank warfare, which has resulted in devastating effects in the Donbas.
• Russian military strategy shows signs of improved coordination and realism, though they remain stretched thin and have depleted a significant portion of their precision-guided missile stockpiles.

Russian Objectives and Political Goals

• Russian aims appear to be evolving from merely capturing the Donbas to the permanent annexation and political incorporation of southern Ukrainian regions.
• Plans for annexation include issuing Russian passports and installing Russian political managers in occupied territories.
• If Russia is satisfied with its territorial gains, it is expected to re-raise political demands regarding Ukraine's non-membership in NATO and restrictions on foreign bases.
• Analysts warn that any future Ukrainian government would find it politically impossible to agree to a settlement involving the cession of territory or neutralization if annexation has already occurred.
• The war is characterized by strategic incoherence regarding the linkage between territorial acquisition and broader political objectives.

Military Capacity and Resource Constraints

• Russia is fighting with a "peacetime" military and has avoided formal mobilization to prevent domestic unrest, relying instead on a "soft mobilization" involving incentives for contract soldiers and inmates.
• Ukraine faces a training deficit and shortages of ammunition and equipment, necessitating continued and increased Western military aid.
• Ukrainian forces have proven effective at imposing costs on Russian occupation but lack the heavy air support and maneuver warfare capacity to retake territory by force in large-scale engagements.
• Russian forces are experiencing morale issues due to the initial catastrophic failures and a lack of coherent messaging regarding the war's purpose.

Economic Impact and Sanctions

• Western sanctions have been escalated in phases, with the impact being more gradual than initially predicted in March.
• Russia's energy revenues (approximately $1 billion/day) have offset the immediate shock of frozen central bank assets and Western corporate exits.
• The Russian economy is projected to contract by 5% to 10% this year, with medium-to-long-term growth severely limited by the inability to import critical technologies and services.
• Sanctions are creating structural damage in specific sectors, such as oil extraction projects in Sakhalin that rely on Western technology, signaling a trend toward a more primitive economy.
• Russian authorities have successfully managed short-term shocks, but long-term economic sustainability is at risk as the state runs out of "Band-Aid" solutions.

Escalation Risks and NATO Dynamics

• Russia has been deterred from using tactical nuclear weapons or expanding the war horizontally (e.g., attacking Moldova or Lithuania) because the strategic cost outweighs current battlefield gains.
• NATO has learned that nuclear deterrence works both ways: it restrains Russia from direct conflict with NATO while limiting how far Western nations can intervene directly to avoid escalation.
• Finland and Sweden have shifted rapidly from neutrality to seeking NATO membership, creating a new, longer border for NATO to defend.
• Russia has specifically targeted NATO's potential infrastructure and troop deployments in the Baltics rather than opposing membership per se.
• Escalation risks remain high as long as the war continues, with the primary trigger for potential Russian escalation being a scenario of desperation or a threat to the regime's survival.

Diplomacy, Ceasefires, and Arms Control

• Neither Russia nor Ukraine currently shows interest in negotiating a ceasefire, as both sides believe they can achieve more favorable positions on the battlefield.
• Renewed arms control negotiations (e.g., a successor to the New START treaty) are impossible while fighting continues; a ceasefire or settlement is a prerequisite for such talks.
• The New START treaty is set to expire in 2026, creating a narrow timeline to negotiate a replacement if diplomacy is to resume.
• A March 2022 proposal from Istanbul remains a potential framework for a future settlement, though it has been effectively sidelined by recent Russian advances and atrocities.
• The Istanbul proposal involved Ukraine agreeing to permanent neutrality and no NATO membership in exchange for Western security guarantees and Russian withdrawal from non-Donbas territory.
• The proposal faces significant hurdles due to the lack of a mechanism to resolve territorial disputes, particularly if Russia proceeds with annexation.

Historical Parallels and Future Outlook

• The 19th-century Belgian independence model, where major powers guaranteed Belgium's permanent neutrality, serves as a historical analogy for the security guarantees Ukraine might receive.
• The primary risk of such a neutrality model is the potential for a future conflict if the guarantor powers (US/Europe) are compelled to intervene militarily if Russia violates the agreement.
• Analysts argue that while emotionally difficult, a settlement requiring concessions is more probable and necessary to prevent a protracted war that leaves Ukraine with continuous threats.
• The "least bad" outcome likely involves an armistice or limited ceasefire that does not resolve underlying security issues, risking a recurrence of crisis in the future.
• There is a growing consensus among Western policymakers that the war is becoming a "grind" that could lead to Russian entrenchment, necessitating a shift from pure military support to identifying negotiation space.
• Samuel Charap emphasizes that think tanks and experts have a duty to keep proposing comprehensive settlement models to ensure they are available if a political opening arises.

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