Nov 8, 2022, 3:16 PM ETInterview, Fireside Chat

Martin Gurri on the revolt of the public & crisis of authority in the information age

The central argument posits a collision between an "information-wielded by ordinary people" and "power represented by elites" who manage industrial-era institutions.
Since approximately 2002, the total amount of information generated globally has doubled every year, creating a "tsunami" of data that dwarfs previous historical growth.
This exponential increase in accessible information has eroded the "command and control" authority of institutions that previously monopolized information and interpretation.
Public trust in government has plummeted from 70–80% in the Kennedy era to below 30% currently; trust in Congress is in the teens, and trust in news media is similarly low.
The prevailing public mood is defined by "negation"—a drive to oppose, destroy, or dismantle the status quo rather than to propose positive, detailed policy alternatives.
Unlike historical revolutionary movements (e.g., 1968), which were hierarchical, ideologically rigid, and aimed to seize state power, modern movements are self-assembling, leaderless, and uninterested in governing.

Movements such as the Yellow Vests (France), the Indignados (Spain), Occupy Wall Street (US), and the Arab Spring rely on "self-assembly" via digital platforms (e.g., Facebook groups) rather than traditional organizational structures.
Participants are typically not economically marginalized; they are often young (mid-30s or under), highly educated, and relatively affluent.
The primary grievance is not objective deprivation but a perceived "social distance" and "cultural disconnect" between the public and elites, who are viewed as an alien species.
In these movements, "incompetence" is universally interpreted as "corruption" or "malign intent" by the public, whereas elites view the public as undisciplined or irrational.
The public demands that elites return to being "citizens like us," rejecting the insulated, armored, and bureaucratic behavior of modern officeholders.

The internet is not the sole driver; the shift began with the expansion of mass media (satellite/TV) which introduced more information channels than the single-source industrial model allowed.
Historical precedents exist (e.g., the printing press enabling the Reformation and French Revolution), but the digital age is unique in its speed, transience, and the "victory of the image over the printed word."
In the industrial era, elites held authority through "accredited expertise" and a top-down "I will educate you" model; the digital era demands that authority be earned daily through relatability and transparency.
China remains a significant anomaly, maintaining stability despite high internet penetration due to strict self-censorship and a unique social contract regarding prosperity versus political freedom.
Spain's 2011 protests were driven less by the immediate economic crisis (which peaked earlier) and more by the perception that the two main parties were in collusion, ignoring the public.

Authoritarianism is less likely in established democracies because the fragmentation of authority and the ability of the public to self-organize make the consolidation of totalitarian power nearly impossible.
Chaos and Nihilism are the primary risks, manifested through phenomena like ISIS (a group of young, internet-savvy nihilists erasing history) and lone-wolf violence triggered by online radicalization.
International relations are shifting inward, with foreign policy becoming a tool for domestic signaling (e.g., Trump and Macron's contrasting nationalist rhetoric) rather than cooperative global governance.
Political stability is characterized by volatility, with short election cycles favoring "negation" and making long-term policy planning (e.g., 50-year horizons) politically unviable.
The "Authenticity" Trap: Voters increasingly prefer politicians who appear "real" and unfiltered (even if lying) over those who appear polished and professional (like Hillary Clinton), creating a perverse incentive for anti-elitist posturing.

Avoiding "Negation": Effective altruists must resist the temptation to focus solely on what is wrong (negation) and instead develop constructive, albeit humble, policy proposals.
Humility in Discourse: Elites and do-gooders must learn to speak in terms of "trial and error," admitting uncertainty and avoiding the promise of "mathematical solutions" to complex human problems.
Flattening the Pyramid: Successful political engagement requires "flattening" the pyramid, where elites act as ordinary citizens (e.g., Estonia's digital government) rather than an insulated class.
Media Funding Crisis: The market-driven media model is degrading quality, as competition for clicks prioritizes entertainment over rigorous investigation; public subsidies or non-profits may be necessary to sustain high-quality journalism.
Career Warning: Entering politics now is highly difficult because candidates must navigate two antagonistic audiences (elites and the public) with opposing expectations, potentially making this a "non-tractable" period for policy change compared to the past or future.

Data Scrutiny: The theory faces challenges from countries like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which lack these specific protests despite digital access; the explanation offered is that local culture, timing, and "sparks" determine if the latent potential for revolt activates.
Stability of Opinion: Public opinion polls on specific issues (e.g., trade, immigration) remain relatively stable over decades, suggesting the "revolt" is driven by a change in how people communicate and their mood rather than a fundamental shift in policy preferences.
Relatability vs. Authenticity: The public may not actually demand "authenticity" (being one's true self) but rather "relatability" and "radical openness," which could require a candidate to strategically change their social circle to appear genuine.
Media Quality: While mass media has degraded, other information sources (books, Wikipedia, academic journals) have improved; the specific crisis lies in the political information ecosystem and the inability of market forces to support costly investigative reporting.
Military Coups: While public dissatisfaction creates risk, the likelihood of a military coup in the US remains low due to the military's constitutional ethos and the high barrier to using force against a highly engaged, vocal public.

The current political turbulence is not a temporary anomaly but a structural shift resulting from the transition from an industrial information model to a digital one.
A generational change in elites is required to restore trust; the current leadership (mostly Boomers/Gen X) is viewed as incapable of the necessary humility and connection.
Future politics will likely involve direct digital engagement with the public (e.g., polling on laws before passing them) to flatten government structures and reduce the social distance between rulers and ruled.
Without a shift toward humility and constructive dialogue, the public's "negation" will continue to fuel nihilistic movements and prevent the resolution of complex global problems.
The window for "boring" politics (returning to pre-2016 norms) is likely closed; the new equilibrium will remain characterized by volatility and the demand for "authentic" engagement from leaders.