National Security: Risk and Responsibility

Emerging Threats and Strategic Priorities

• Biotechnology as a National Security Threat:
  • Congressman Seth Moulton identifies biotechnology as a critical, under-prioritized future threat where the "winner-take-all" nature of the technology favors a single global leader.
  • China is explicitly pursuing dominance in biotech to control future manufacturing, nanoscale capabilities, and pandemic response, potentially leaving the U.S. economically and militarily behind within 20 years.
  • Moulton argues the U.S. must invest immediately in biotech to prevent China from setting global norms for governance and technology.
• Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Vulnerabilities:
  • Mira Ricardel highlights critical dependencies on space and satellites, noting China and Russia's growing anti-satellite capabilities and the lack of U.S. resilience in communications and financial networks.
  • Dmitry Alperovitch points to the vulnerability of undersea cables, which carry the vast majority of global internet traffic, citing risks of severance or wiretapping by adversaries during crises.
  • Alperovitch warns that ransomware attacks on local election infrastructure (voter rolls, poll books) pose a more immediate threat to U.S. elections than state-sponsored hacking.
• Global Warming as a Security Challenge:
  • Former Secretary Jay Johnson asserts that climate change is the number one national security threat, characterizing it as a "slow-motion" danger often overlooked due to its gradual onset.
  • Johnson notes the lack of bipartisan consensus on the issue, which hinders effective national and global action.

The China Challenge and Great Power Competition

• Shift from Terrorism to Great Power Competition:
  • The panel overwhelmingly agrees that great power competition, specifically with China, has superseded concerns about terrorism as the primary strategic focus.
  • Dmitry Alperovitch describes the relationship as a 20-year "economic war" where Chinese state actors have systematically stolen intellectual property to subsidize the rise of companies like Huawei.
  • Congressman Moulton characterizes the current trajectory as a "1914 moment," suggesting a risk of hot war due to a fundamental clash of values (authoritarianism vs. democracy) rather than just territory or resources.
• China's Asymmetric Military Strategy:
  • Moulton notes China is bypassing traditional arms races (e.g., aircraft carriers) by producing anti-ship missiles at a 1,300-to-1 ratio compared to U.S. carrier production costs.
  • Mira Ricardel cites "civil-military fusion" as a key strategy, where commercial technological gains are directly repurposed for military goals under the "Made in China 2025" initiative.
  • Ricardel identifies specific flashpoints, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the potential for accidental escalation via anti-satellite weapon tests.
• Alliance and Economic Strategy:
  • The panel advocates for modernizing alliances based on technological capability and shared democratic values rather than just geography.
  • Dimitri Alperovitch suggests the development of a "techno-NATO" or economic bloc in the Asia-Pacific that excludes China to counterbalance its economic rise.
  • Alperovitch and Moulton agree that the internet is becoming "balkanized" or "vulcanized," with China and Russia promoting authoritarian standards to control information flow.

Election Security and Disinformation

• Evolution of Cyber Threats (2016 vs. 2020):
  • Dmitry Alperovitch states that direct state-sponsored hacking of election infrastructure in 2020 is unlikely compared to 2016 due to tighter deadlines and improved defenses.
  • The primary threat has shifted to persistent disinformation campaigns that are no longer tied to election cycles but are integrated into daily life to divide the populace.
  • Alperovitch identifies ransomware as the number one scourge, posing a tangible risk of locking down voter databases or poll books on election day.
• Domestic and External Divisive Forces:
  • Congresswoman (sic) Mira Ricardel and Secretary Johnson argue that domestic disinformation often originates from internal political actors, with foreign adversaries (Russia, China, Iran) acting as "aiders and abettors."
  • Moulton expresses concern that political rhetoric questioning election results, combined with foreign interference and groups like QAnon, could trigger a post-election crisis of confidence.
  • Jay Johnson emphasizes that the media and the public must take responsibility for calling out "fake news" and applying skepticism to information consumption.

Policy, Budget, and Recommendations

• Defense Budget Restructuring:
  • Moulton recommends cutting legacy defense programs that serve political interests in congressional districts to reallocate funds toward AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology.
  • The House Armed Services Committee's bipartisan report calls for a "tough" analysis of existing commitments to free up resources for emerging technologies.
• Public-Private Coordination:
  • Alperovitch critiques the current lack of federal leadership in cyber defense, noting that Microsoft and Cyber Command often acted independently rather than cohesively during recent takedowns of botnets.
  • He calls for a federal "CONOPS" (Concept of Operations) that integrates private sector capabilities under government direction to confront nation-state and criminal adversaries.
  • Secretary Johnson advocates for a multifaceted approach to China that integrates economic leverage with national security, rejecting purely transactional views of the relationship.
• Election Infrastructure Recommendations:
  • Homework for Panelists:
    • Moulton: Urge the public to recognize that the greatest threat to election success is internal disinformation and the erosion of democratic norms.
    • Ricardel: Ask citizens to consider who benefits from national division, specifically identifying Russia and China as adversaries seeking to undermine democracy.
    • Johnson: Call for citizens to become "informed patriots" by researching the mechanics of voting and candidate platforms to combat misinformation.
    • Alperovitch: Suggest state legislatures change laws to allow early counting of mail-in ballots to prevent post-election uncertainty and contention.
• Legislative and Regulatory Actions:
  • Moulton argues that elected officials, not tech CEOs, must establish the guidelines for platform censorship and content moderation.
  • Alperovitch stresses that the U.S. must provide funding and legal authorities to CISA (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) to better assist local municipalities with election security.
  • The panelists generally agree that sanctions alone are insufficient for deterrence and that the U.S. must develop new pressure points to respond to adversarial cyber activities.