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Panel, Conference Presentation

National Security: Risk and Responsibility

  • Congress and the House Armed Services Committee plan to develop a 30-year defense strategy to address emerging threats, moving beyond the standard 12-month budget cycle.
  • U.S. investment in biotechnology is critical to prevent China from becoming the world leader in the field within 20 years, which would cause significant economic and national security disadvantages.
  • The global technological paradigm is expected to shift from an "infotech revolution" to a "biotek revolution," positioning biotechnology as essential for manufacturing and pandemic response.
  • Unappreciated dependencies create a risk of surprise disruptions in food, personal protective equipment (PPE), and medicine supply chains similar to pandemic-era shortages.
  • Significant consequences may arise if communication networks, financial systems, or power grids are disabled by cyber attacks, raising concerns about current resilience levels.
  • China is expected to continue aggressively expanding anti-satellite capabilities and space dominance, threatening U.S. satellite communications and networks.
  • The U.S. lacks sufficient understanding of vulnerabilities regarding pandemics, cyber attacks, and satellite protection within its supply chains.
  • China is identified as the number one threat for this century, characterized by increasing belligerence and an economic war ongoing for the last 20 years.
  • Chinese state actors are expected to continue targeting U.S. and Western companies via cyber mechanisms to steal intellectual property in biotech, technology, and agriculture.
  • Adversaries including Russia and China are increasingly capable of tapping into or severing undersea internet cables, posing significant risks to global communications.
  • There is a risk that Chinese telecommunications equipment could be used to shut down network connectivity in allied nations during a crisis.
  • Large-scale election hacking similar to 2016 events is considered unlikely in the final weeks before the 2020 election due to timeline constraints.
  • Disinformation campaigns by Russia, Iran, and China are expected to become a permanent "new normal" in everyday life rather than being tied solely to election cycles.
  • A ransomware attack on local election infrastructure on election day is feared as a major threat capable of causing confusion, long lines, and registration verification failures.
  • Cybercriminal groups, not just nation-states, are expected to continue executing ransomware attacks against states and municipalities as the number one current scourge.
  • Global warming and climate change are predicted to remain a "slow-motion" threat that national security officials fail to prioritize despite increasing evidence.
  • Domestic division and a lack of shared facts are expected to act as internal threats to national security.
  • Tech companies are expected to increase election security efforts, though elected officials deem current measures insufficient.
  • Elected officials are expected to establish regulations and guidelines for tech platforms rather than leaving censorship decisions to private executives.
  • U.S. internal election infrastructure is projected to be significantly more robust in 2020 compared to 2016, with defensive capabilities expected to thwart Russian infiltration.
  • Non-state actors like QAnon are expected to adopt Russian tactics to infiltrate the election process.
  • A scenario is anticipated where Republicans lead on election night based on in-person votes, while Democrats gain the advantage as mail-in ballots are counted.
  • There is a fear that the President could sow dissension about election validity immediately after the event, potentially creating a democracy crisis if combined with external interference.
  • Disinformation campaigns could remain hidden from public recognition for six to 18 months after the event due to their nature.
  • The public is expected to face active disinformation campaigns from Russia, and potentially China and Iran, targeting democracy, election infrastructure, and campaigns.
  • Disinformation is expected to have increasing domestic origins, allowing Russian actors to act as "aiders and abettors" rather than primary originators.
  • The U.S. is projected to shift from conventional nation-against-nation hot wars toward covert, proxy, and cyber warfare.
  • A hot war between the U.S. and China is considered a very real possibility due to fundamental clashes of values and the authoritarian nature of the Chinese system.
  • China is expected to continue exporting its authoritarian governance model to other nations through technology, government systems, and investment, particularly in Africa.
  • The U.S. is losing the technological race against China in AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology unless significant budget changes are made.
  • Taiwan and the South China Sea are identified as potential flashpoints that could lead to a hot war.
  • A military exercise or anti-satellite weapon test could accidentally hit a U.S. or allied satellite, triggering an unexpected response.
  • China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative is expected to continue creating influence through loans and money in other countries.
  • The international community is expected to increasingly view nation strength by conventional military capabilities, even as conflicts shift toward unconventional forms.
  • Progress on international cyber treaties is expected to remain minimal, prompting a need for new economic alliances in the Asia Pacific to counterbalance China.
  • The internet is expected to become increasingly "balkanized" or "vulcanized," with China, Russia, and Iran controlling information flow within their borders.
  • A new generation of alliances based on technological capability and democratic values, rather than geography, is expected to be necessary.
  • The U.S. is expected to face a difficult strategic decision regarding the extent of decoupling from China in the technology sector.
  • The U.S. defense budget will likely require tough cuts to legacy platforms to fund investments in emerging technologies like AI, quantum computing, and biotechnology.
  • The Biden administration is expected to view the relationship with China as multifaceted, considering economic and security aspects together, whereas the Trump administration was characterized as viewing relationships transactionally.
  • Local and county election officials are expected to remain vulnerable due to a reliance on volunteers and individuals lacking cyber expertise.
  • Sanctions are expected to have limited deterrent value against adversaries like Iran, North Korea, and Russia because they are already "sanctioned to death."
  • Legislators in states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin are expected to be able to change laws to allow for early counting of absentee ballots to reduce post-election contention.
  • Adversaries like China and Russia benefit from domestic political divisiveness and electoral incompetence, creating a strategic environment the U.S. needs to recognize.