Serhii Plokhy: History of Ukraine, Russia, Soviet Union, KGB, Nazis & War | Lex Fridman Podcast #415

The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the "Last Empire"

• Three Distinct Processes: The historian distinguishes between the collapse of communist ideology, the end of the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet state; the latter is defined by the geographic separation of cities like Kyiv, Minsk, and Dushanbe from Moscow.
• Geopolitical Continuity: The 1991 collapse is viewed as the continuation of the disintegration of the Russian Empire (starting 1917), interrupted by Bolshevik internationalism and resumed by the late 1980s.
• U.S. Stance on Disintegration: The United States did not intend for the Soviet Union to collapse; documents from 1948 and 1991 show Washington sought to keep the union together to maintain Gorbachev as a partner and secure nuclear weapons.
• Chicken Kiev Speech: In August 1991, President George H.W. Bush delivered a speech in Kyiv explicitly warning Ukrainians against seeking independence, reflecting U.S. attempts to preserve the Soviet Union until November 1991.
• Economic Insolvency: By 1991, the Russian Federation was bankrupt; economic advisor Yegor Gaidar advised that Russia could no longer subsidize other republics and needed to retain oil and gas revenue.
• Ukraine's Decisive Role: The Ukrainian referendum on December 1, 1991, was the catalyst for the Soviet dissolution; Russia's president Yeltsin noted that without Ukraine, Russia would be outvoted by Muslim republics and the union economically unviable.
• Imperial Structure Shift: Post-1991 Russia eliminated national republics with special rights to prevent future disintegration, resulting in a more centralized, Russified state compared to the Soviet era.

Historical Foundations of Slavic Identity and Statehood

• Origins of Slavic Peoples: Genetic and linguistic analysis places the origin of Slavs in the Pripyat marshes (modern-day Ukraine, Belarus, Poland) during the 8th and 9th centuries, spreading from the Adriatic to the Pacific.
• Kievan Rus' as a Multi-ethnic State: Kievan Rus' was a medieval state built on Viking trade routes between the Baltic and Constantinople, creating a shared mythology of Christianity and legal code that is now contested by Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian nationalists.
• Moscow's Rise: Moscow emerged as the capital under Mongol rule in the 14th/15th centuries; the "gathering of Russian lands" only fully materialized by 1945 when Transcarpathian Ukraine was transferred to the Soviet Union.
• The "History of the Rus'" Text: A 19th-century manuscript claimed Cossacks were the "true Rus," shifting the imperial logic from loyalty to elites to loyalty based on nation, language, and culture, sparking the Ukrainian national project.
• Five Independence Attempts: Ukraine declared independence five times in the 20th century; four failed, with the sole success occurring in 1991 when the majority of the parliament (Communist Party members) voted for independence.

The Bandera Myth, Far-Right Extremism, and Propaganda

• Stepan Bandera's Reality: Bandera led the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in the 1930s, collaborating with Nazi Germany in hopes of securing Ukrainian independence, leading to his imprisonment by the Nazis.
• Banderite Mythology: Although Bandera spent most of WWII in German concentration camps or exile, his name became a symbol for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) which fought Soviet forces into the early 1950s.
• KGB Assassination: The KGB assassin Bogdan Stashinsky killed Bandera in 1959 using a spray pistol; the incident was later romanticized in Ian Fleming's The Man with the Golden Gun.
• Marginalization of the Far Right: In 2019, the most radical far-right party in Ukraine received only 2.15% of the vote; Ukraine has no far-right representation in parliament, a rarity compared to Western Europe.
• "Denazification" Narrative: The Russian claim of "denazification" is a propaganda tool leveraging WWII memory; statistically, if this were the goal, the war would prioritize targeting nations with larger far-right movements (e.g., France, Hungary).
• SS Galicia Division: Ukraine contributed 10,000–20,000 troops to the SS Galicia Division, a small minority compared to the 2–3 million Ukrainians fighting in the Red Army; this fact is often exaggerated in Russian propaganda.
• Yaroslav Hanka Incident: A 2023 Canadian Parliament standing ovation for a WWII veteran was misinterpreted by Russian propaganda as support for Nazis, ignoring the complexity of his service and the shallow political nature of the oversight.

Path to War: 2014–2022

• 2014 Annexation of Crimea: Russia seized Crimea immediately after the "Revolution of Dignity," a reaction to Ukraine's pivot toward the EU, which would have prevented Ukraine from joining the Eurasian Union.
• Donbas Hybrid War: Russia destabilized the Donbas region using Russian agents (e.g., Igor Girkin) and economic grievances, framing the conflict as the defense of ethnic Russians despite the lack of independent mobilization.
• Putin's 2021 Essay: In "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," Putin asserted that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians constitute "one people," echoing 19th-century imperial ideology rather than post-1917 national realities.
• NATO as an Excuse: Putin cited NATO expansion as a primary cause for war, yet Western leaders consistently told him in 2008 and 2022 that Ukrainian membership was not imminent; the war resulted in Finland and Sweden joining NATO.
• Strategic Failure: The initial goal was to keep Ukraine within Russia's sphere of influence; when this failed, "Plan B" shifted to annexing territories and incorporating them into the Russian constitution, making withdrawal legally difficult.

The Current War and Future Trajectories

• Zelensky's Leadership: President Zelensky remained in Kyiv during the initial invasion, rejecting exile; his decision is attributed to his ability to unify a country that was more cohesive after the 2014 loss of Crimea than previously imagined.
• Peace Negotiation Failure: Talks failed due to unacceptable Russian conditions (territorial loss, demilitarization, exclusion from the West); subsequent Ukrainian battlefield successes and war crimes (Bucha) made compromise impossible.
• Constitutional Deadlock: Russia's annexation of five Ukrainian oblasts into its constitution creates a legal barrier to peace, as any withdrawal to pre-2022 borders would require constitutional amendment.
• Zaluzhny Removal: The firing of popular General Zaluzhny signals a potential shift in Ukrainian military tactics toward more technological warfare and political centralization under Zelensky.
• Authoritarian Risks: While the war creates pressure to consolidate power, Ukrainian history as a "pluralistic state" and the dominance of democracy make a slide into authoritarianism or far-right rule unlikely.
• The "Russian Question": The war is the realization of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's 1990s vision for a "Greater Russia" uniting Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, which failed to materialize after the USSR's collapse.

Chernobyl, Nuclear Safety, and Global Order

• Chernobyl and Soviet Collapse: The 1986 disaster was a catalyst for the Soviet collapse; the state's secrecy and refusal to admit the truth fueled "eco-nationalism" and mass mobilization that undermined the regime's legitimacy.
• Structural Nuclear Risks: The series Chernobyl accurately captured the "cost of lies" and authoritarian secrecy, though it dramatized specific political confrontations; the core lesson is that nuclear safety is contingent on political transparency.
• War on Nuclear Sites: The 2022 war introduced the threat of direct military attacks on nuclear facilities (e.g., Zaporizhzhia), creating vulnerabilities similar to Fukushima where power loss leads to meltdown risks.
• Global Nuclear Paralysis: Major nuclear accidents historically trigger a global freeze on new reactor construction (e.g., post-Fukushima), rendering nuclear energy politically unreliable for climate change mitigation.
• Return of Cold War Dynamics: The world is shifting from a U.S. unipolar system back to a bipolar structure centered on the U.S. and China, with Russia attempting to regain status as a pole but having significantly diminished military and economic power.
• The Lesson of 1962: The Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved not by strategy alone but by leaders of the "Bikini Atoll generation" who were personally terrified of nuclear war, a psychological factor fading in the current generation of politicians.