Jan 3, 2020, 12:37 PM ETInterview, Podcast

Stephen Kotkin: Stalin, Putin, and the Nature of Power | Lex Fridman Podcast #63

Human beings do not universally crave unconstrained power; they crave security, love, or adventure, with only a minority seeking absolute, life-or-death authority over others.
Unconstrained executive power is historically detrimental, often leading to increased decision-making errors, extremism, and long-term systemic collapse due to the lack of challenges or input.
Institutional constraints (separation of powers, checks and balances) are fundamental to preventing authoritarianism and ensuring institutional endurance, as seen in the US model versus the circumstantial constraints (e.g., geography, time) in Russia.
George Washington represents a historical counter-example of an ambitious leader who voluntarily chose institutionalization over personal excess power.
Current Russian support for Vladimir Putin is partly attributed to the "absence of alternatives" rather than a deep-seated cultural preference for authoritarianism, as the population cannot compare him to viable rivals.

Putin successfully bridged a societal divide by appealing to the "losers" of the post-Soviet transition (rural, small-town populations) via traditional values while using Dmitry Medvedev to attract the urban, entrepreneurial "winners."
Russia experienced an average 7% annual economic growth for a decade after Putin took office, driven by liberalizing policies (lower taxes, deregulation, land sales), the 1998 ruble crash (making exports cheap), and surging global demand from China for Soviet-era industrial commodities.
Oil prices averaged $50/barrel during Russia's high-growth period; the fact that the economy stagnated when oil prices exceeded $100/barrel proves the growth was not solely commodity-dependent.
Russia has suffered a "human capital hemorrhage," with 5–10 million people leaving the country since 1991; those departing are predominantly young, educated, and entrepreneurial, weakening the state's long-term potential.
Disillusionment with Putin is currently high within the state bureaucracy and elite circles who understand the reality of declining infrastructure, human capital, and corruption, though they cannot publicly oppose the regime due to fear for their families and careers.
Putin's popularity received a significant boost from the annexation of Crimea but has since trended downward, particularly in urban areas, as the initial "Medvedev ruse" to manage different factions expired.

Stalin's rise was contingent rather than inevitable, occurring because Lenin created the specific position of General Secretary for Stalin to manage the party, and Lenin subsequently suffered strokes that left Stalin as the only figure with day-to-day control.
Unlike Lenin, who was a charismatic theorist, Stalin was selected as General Secretary for his organizational competence, work ethic, and reliability, not as a designated successor.
Stalin was a genuine true believer in communism and Russian statism; his ideology was not merely a mask for power but a driver for his actions, though he justified his ruthless methods (violence, lies, manipulation) as necessary to achieve these ends.
The 20th-century appeal of communism was contextual, arising from the failures of capitalism during the Great Depression, fascism, and imperialism; however, history demonstrates that eliminating markets and private property leads to tyranny and shortages rather than the freedom Marx predicted.
There is a fundamental distinction between "normal politics" (left-right debate within a democratic framework respecting rule of law) and "extremist politics" (far-left or far-right attempts to eliminate the system, markets, or constraints on power).
History shows that eliminating capitalism to achieve a "utopia" results in mass violence and deprivation, whereas social democrats who sought to regulate and redistribute within a market system avoided these catastrophic outcomes.

Russia's path to stability requires institutional evolution from within the regime, led by a coalition of patriotic officials who prioritize long-term state health over personal enrichment.
Revolution and violence are rarely sustainable solutions; the preferred path is the development of functioning courts, a parliament, open markets, and meritocratic civil services that do not rely on "miracles" or strongmen.
Putin has the potential to hold power for as long as Stalin (approx. 30 years), but such a trajectory would be devastating for Russia due to the compounding of human capital loss and institutional decay.
The "drug of power" effect suggests that leaders like Putin may struggle to imagine life without absolute authority, conflating their personal power with the nation's well-being and losing the ability to relate to ordinary citizens.
Lex Friedman notes that the Oliver Stone documentary interview with Putin failed to uncover deep psychological truths, suggesting Putin avoids reflecting on the morality or long-term consequences of his actions.
Stephen Kotkin identifies a critical distinction in leadership: the greatest leaders are those capable of stepping away from power, whereas dictators become unable to function without it.

Conflict and war are enduring features of the human condition due to conflicting interests, but strong institutions are designed to resolve these peacefully.
The primary existential threat to humanity is "great power conflict" (e.g., US-China war), which could result in hundreds of millions of deaths, necessitating a global focus on preventing planetary-scale destruction.
Equality of outcome is historically unattainable and counterproductive; healthy societies must focus on ensuring equality of opportunity, particularly through improved education systems.
The failure of the Soviet Union is attributed to the impossibility of minimizing "civilian casualties" (human rights and economic freedom) when employing the "nuclear bomb" of eliminating markets and private property.
Stalin's famous quote emphasizes that the mechanics of counting votes (controlling the state apparatus) matter infinitely more than the voting itself, highlighting the importance of institutional control over popular will.