Interview, Podcast
Stephen Kotkin: Stalin, Putin, and the Nature of Power | Lex Fridman Podcast #63
- Anticipates artificial intelligence will facilitate a "civilization's journey" into understanding and replicating the human mind within machines.
- Plans to place "one or two minutes" of advertisements after the introduction of episodes while ensuring "never any ads in the middle" to preserve conversational flow.
- Expects that using the code "LexPodcast" will provide the user with "$10" and result in "Cash App" donating "$10" to FIRST.
- Predicts that individuals craving "unconstrained power" rarely achieve this dream, as "very few" actually obtain the opportunity.
- Expects that "unlimited or largely unconstrained executive power" is ultimately detrimental even to the individual wielding it, as it eventually "catches up to them."
- Anticipates that institutional designs preventing rapid action, such as the U.S. separation of powers, possess long-term "strength of the institutions" despite causing short-term frustration.
- Forecasts that "many Americans" hold a "real sentiment" for authoritarian leadership, though this represents "by no means a majority" or "even a plurality."
- Expects that "impatience," "impulsive quality," and "frustration" in Russia may fuel a craving for an "unconstrained executive," though this is "not sure that that's a majority sentiment" currently.
- Anticipates that "under authoritarian regimes," public opinion is heavily constrained by the environment, making true sentiment difficult to gauge.
- Predicts that Putin has developed an appeal to "traditional values and the Orthodox Church" since the start of his rule, a trait he previously lacked.
- Expects that introducing alternatives to the Russian population could reduce Putin's current popularity if those alternatives prove superior.
- Anticipates that "mass protests in the urban areas" following the "Medvedev castling" exposed "delusions" and led to public disillusionment.
- Expects Putin received a significant popularity boost from the "annexation of Crimea," though the trend is now "diminishing again."
- Anticipates "disillusionment" exists within the state administration regarding declining infrastructure and human capital, though officials cannot publicly oppose the regime due to "cowardice" or "realism."
- Predicts that if an "alternative appears," potentially from "inside the regime," things "could shift quickly."
- Expects Russia "is not a failed country" and has historically demonstrated the ability to "reverse its trajectory" when conditions worsen.
- Anticipates that "violence is rarely ever a solution" for societal change because "societal upheaval is not a way always to institutionalize a better path forward."
- Expects Russia's solution lies in a "coalition fashion" creating a "new power sharing arrangement" for "long-term sustainable growth without upheaval, without violence."
- Anticipates Russia requires stronger institutions, including a "court system," "democratic institutions," "functioning open dynamic markets," and a "meritocracy."
- Predicts a "George Washington figure" may be needed to "push through institutionalization rather than personalism," though renewal is not seen under the current regime.
- Expects the need for functioning institutions like a "Duma or a parliament" and an "impartial professional civil service" rather than reliance on "very impressive" individuals.
- Anticipates the "October Revolution" was a "coup on the left" where Lenin and Stalin won a "civil war" and became entrenched by 1921.
- Expects Stalin utilized his position as "General Secretary" to create a "personal dictatorship inside the Bolshevik dictatorship."
- Predicts that if Lenin had been "a healthier figure," Stalin might never have become the dictator known in history, emphasizing contingency over inevitability.
- Anticipates Stalin was a "true believer" in communism and a "statist," which helped him win followers due to his defense of "Russian state interests."
- Expects the image of capitalism was negative during the interwar period due to the "Great Depression" and "imperialism," giving "communism some appeal" both inside and outside the Soviet Union.
- Anticipates that "after World War II," capitalism rose from the ashes to become "much more successful" and "non-violent," changing the context significantly.
- Expects that "if you eliminate capitalism you get to a worse world," citing historical lessons where elimination produced "tyranny and mass violence death and shortages."
- Anticipates that the "far left and the far right" are "wrong" if they seek to "eliminate constraints on executive power" and control the public sphere.
- Predicts that "equality of outcome is unreachable and is a mistake," whereas "equality of opportunity" is the correct goal.
- Expects that current school systems "are not providing equality of opportunity for the majority of people."
- Anticipates the Oliver Stone documentary with Putin was a "complete failure" due to a "complete lack of diving deep into the person."
- Expects inquiries to Putin should focus on where he thinks "Russia is going to be in 25 years or 50 years."
- Anticipates Putin has accumulated experience serving longer than Leonid Brezhnev's "18-year reign."
- Predicts Putin may believe Russia is on an "up swing" or may not care about the long-term trajectory if he does not believe it.
- Expects power becomes "almost a drug" that leaders find "difficult to give up," causing them to "conflate their personal power with the well-being of the nation."
- Anticipates Putin belongs to a category of leaders who "can no longer imagine what it would be like just to be an ordinary citizen."
- Expects inquiries into a leader's psychological state should address "how does it start" and "What ARE the parts of the day you look forward to the most."
- Anticipates it remains a mystery if figures like Stalin wished for a "simpler life" or were "so drunk, so enamored... with exercising this kind of power" that they could not live without it.
- Expects "conflicting interests and conflicting goals" will persist, with most resolved peacefully but some inevitably turning violent.
- Predicts "Great power conflict is unbelievably bad," noting World War II killed at least "55 million people" and a World War III could result in death counts of "155 million, 255 million 555 million."
- Anticipates that "avoiding planetary scale destruction is really important" and the goal is to manage interests so "no one sees advantage in a violent resolution."
- Expects "Stalin is also a product of circumstances," noting he "never fights in the war" and spent "World War I... in exile in Siberia."
- Anticipates the Bolsheviks led by Lenin performed a "coup on the left" despite "three quarters plus of the country votes socialist" in late 1917.
- Expects Lenin made Stalin "general secretary of the Communist Party" in the "spring of 1922" to "institutionalize a helpmate," not as a pre-planned succession, before suffering a major stroke.
- Predicts that if Lenin had been a "healthier figure," Stalin might never have become the historical figure he is, emphasizing the role of contingency.
- Expects Stalin was a "very effective organizer" chosen by Lenin because he "would carry out assignments no matter how difficult," even if others seemed more brilliant.
- Anticipates Stalin's "phenomenal memory" for "people's names and faces and events" was "very advantageous" for building the Soviet state and bureaucracy.
- Expects Stalin's dual dedication to "enacting communism" and "building a powerful state" won him followers despite his reliance on "manipulation," "violence," and "lies."
- Anticipates the "interwar conjuncture" of capitalism's failure allowed communism to "hold some appeal" as an alternative to "imperialism, fascism, and Great Depression."
- Expects socialists who realized eliminating capitalism "wouldn't get freedom" became "social democrats" who "use the state to regulate the market."
- Anticipates the "American Revolution" established a "universal humanity model" where the "category citizen can expand" over time.
- Expects "normal politics" allows for "left-right political spectrum" debates, while problems arise at the "extremes" that do not recognize the legitimacy of capitalism or democratic rule of law.
- Predicts that "violence is rarely ever a solution" in transforming societies, citing that protests in the "Middle East" did not necessarily lead to better systems.
- Expects a group within Russian power structures must see things "not developing relative to neighbors" to initiate a "coalition fashion" change for "long-term sustainable growth."
- Anticipates that eliminating capitalism results in a "worse world," citing historical examples where it produced "tyranny and mass violence death and shortages."
- Expects "Marx wasn't bothered by inequality" but was "bothered by something deeper, something worse... alienation, of dehumanization."
- Anticipates the "rift on the left" between "Leninists" and "Social Democrats" has existed "almost from the beginning" and persists with confusion over strategy.
- Expects the "American Revolution" provided a "great gift" through "separation of powers and constraint on executive power" because founders were "afraid of tyranny."
- Anticipates the "job that we have for humanity's sake is to make those conflicting interests... to resolve peacefully and not in a zero-sum fashion."
- Expects Stalin built a personal dictatorship because he was "cunning, he was ruthless, and he was a workaholic," and could not have held the position without being "exceptionally competent."
- Anticipates that "after World War II," the Soviet Union had a "tough time competing" against a post-war context where capitalism was "much more successful."
- Expects Russia is "not investing in its future" with an economy that is "not really growing" or "diversifying," leading to "disillusionment in the state apparatus."
- Anticipates "human capital loss" is "phenomenal" for Russia, with "somewhere between 5 and 10 million people have Left the country" since 1991, taking the "more dynamic parts of the population" with them.
- Expects the "crash of the ruble in 1998" facilitated the "revival of domestic manufacturing," which combined with "China's phenomenal growth" to create a decade of "average of seven percent growth a year."
- Anticipates that during the two terms of 7% growth, oil prices averaged "around $50 a barrel," suggesting growth was "not attributable predominantly to oil prices."
- Expects that "disposable income after inflation" during Putin's first two terms was "growing greater than 7%, in some cases 10% a year."
- Anticipates that Putin, being "healthy," could "well last as many years as Stalin," though it is "hard to predict because events intercede sometimes."
- Expects it is "tough for us to gauge" Putin's popularity due to the "lack of alternatives," though he is "unpopular inside the state administration."
- Anticipates that the elite group "narrows and narrows," causing resentment to grow as interest groups are excluded from power and the fruits of the system.
- Expects Stalin was chosen among options because he was seen as the "better option" for the organizational role, not as a pre-planned successor.
- Anticipates that after World War II, a "middle-class economic boom" from the "late 40s through the 70s" made capitalism "much more successful" and diminished the appeal of communism.
- Expects "Russia needs stronger institutions," including a "court system," "democratic institutions," and "meritocracy."
- Anticipates that "violence is rarely ever a solution" because "societal upheaval is not a way always to institutionalize a better path forward."