Fireside Chat, Interview
The art of deception in modern war | The Economist
- Understanding adversary capabilities does not confirm intentions, as seen in the incorrect Ukrainian deduction regarding Russian movements north of Kyiv.
- Extensive surveillance creates opportunities for deception by shaping enemy expectations rather than relying on building invisible fake armies.
- Deception strategies aim to misalign adversary resource allocation to create unrecoverable deficits, utilizing historical precedents like the Calais to Normandy shift.
- Decoys remain effective in transparent environments by drawing enemy fire and expending scarce munitions on non-real targets.
- Drone and uncrewed technology displaces or increases total human personnel requirements rather than eliminating them.
- FPV drone missions require a five-person crew, including a pilot and support roles for munitions and power, operating from protected positions for an endurance of approximately three days.
- A 50-drone FPV operation necessitates two vehicles and a ton to a ton and a half of equipment, requiring excavated positions for concealment against detection.
- The vehicles and personnel team supporting a 50-drone engagement face a near-certain destruction rate, requiring survivors to evacuate on foot post-operations.
- Complex robotic systems depend on a substantial human hinterland for supply, management, and operational functionality.