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Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE can't stop the Yemen war | The Economist

  • Deterioration of Saudi-Emirati Relations

    • Historically close ties between Saudi Arabia and the UAE (shared resources, monarchy, Islam) have soured due to:
      • Personal animosity: MBS (Saudi) seeks regional dominance, while MBZ (UAE) resents being directed by the "younger" Crown Prince.
      • Divergent strategic cultures: Saudi foreign policy prioritizes Arab/Muslim world sovereignty; UAE prioritizes global trade hubs, non-state actor engagement, and deals with breakaway entities.
  • Yemen Conflict Divergence

    • Both nations share the goal of reducing Houthi control but employ opposing strategies:
      • Saudi Arabia: Supports factions preserving a unified Yemen state.
      • UAE: Backed the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group seeking an independent South Yemen.
    • Outcome: Saudi-backed forces eventually forced the UAE to curtail support for separatists, yet the underlying strategic schism remains.
  • Sudan Crisis Dynamics

    • Strategic Mismatch:
      • UAE prioritized commercial security, backing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for protection of port and infrastructure investments.
      • Saudi Arabia prioritized state sovereignty, supporting the regular Sudanese Army.
    • Commercial vs. Security Interests:
      • UAE view: Red Sea access is primarily a commercial investment protection issue.
      • Saudi view: Red Sea is a security imperative, especially after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, making the Red Sea vital for Saudi oil exports.
    • Conflict Intensification:
      • UAE involvement in funding the RSF facilitates gold laundering for Hamidi, fueling the looting-driven war.
      • Multiple belligerent actors (Army vs. RSF) increase complexity, making conflict resolution statistically harder and prolonging the humanitarian disaster.
  • Horn of Africa Food Security Strategy

    • Gulf states (including Qatar) have invested heavily in purchasing arable land in the Horn of Africa to secure food imports.
    • Specific UAE assets include large tracts of fertile Nile River land in Sudan.
    • Criticism of this approach:
      • Strategically flawed: Global food supply is sufficient; the core need is secure sea lanes, not land ownership.
      • Self-defeating: Land acquisition and foreign meddling have fueled local conflict and famine, jeoparduring the very supply chains the investments were meant to protect.