Dec 8, 2025, 12:02 PM ETInterview, Fireside Chat

Why Syria might face another uprising

Syria is currently in a "sectarian hangover" phase where suppressed sectarian tensions are resurfacing following the end of the civil war.
Alawites, the sect associated with the former Assad regime, are central to growing instability due to their historical role in the security sector.
In March, massacres in Alawite coastal areas and attempts by Alawite militants to insurrect were met with pro-government force and mobs, resulting in over 1,500 deaths.
Approximately 25,000 Alawites have fled Syria in the last year, including 4,000 to 5,000 senior officers and soldiers.
Former regime officers are actively attempting to recruit for a new insurgency and establish training camps outside Syria.
Political disenfranchisement is exacerbating the risk of insurgency; Alawites in Homs (representing a third of the city) have zero representation in the new parliament.
President Ahmad al-Shara is rarely photographed with prominent Alawite figures, effectively isolating the community from the new state.

The immediate post-Assad era has avoided the feared outcomes of an Islamic State or Taliban-style governance; women are being recruited into the police, and alcohol sales have resumed in old Damascus.
The removal of the Assad regime eliminated the secret police network, torture chambers, and mass arbitrary detention.
Freedom of speech has been restored, with citizens openly criticizing the government in public spaces for the first time in 50–60 years.
The economic situation has deteriorated for many, as hundreds of thousands of government employees, including soldiers and civil servants, have been dismissed without salaries.
Subsidies are being cut, and sanctions relief has not yet produced material improvements or reconstruction on the ground.
Transitional justice has failed; Assad's cronies remain in exile in Lebanon, Russia, and Iran, while some key figures have been recruited by the new government to manage sensitive files.
Near-daily violence, including revenge killings and sectarian attacks, continues to occur in Homs, Hama, the coastal countryside, and the Aleppo countryside.
Activists argue the revolution was driven by a demand for dignity and justice, values that remain unfulfilled under the current administration.

The new Syrian state is heavily centralized around President Ahmad al-Shara, who is reportedly cannibalizing inherited state institutions.
"Shadow governments" loyal to al-Shara are emerging with de facto powers that override constitutional ministries, operating with zero public oversight.
A new "Office of Political Affairs," established via decree without constitutional mandate, is expanding its reach into internal affairs, voter vetting, and NGO interfacing across the country.
This structure creates an "embryo of a new authoritarian control" structure, raising concerns similar to the previous 50-year dictatorship.
Decision-making is concentrated among a small circle of six to ten individuals, rendering the state inefficient and unrepresentative.
A functioning parliament is expected to convene by the new year, but its role remains uncertain as a potential check on presidential power versus a rubber-stamp body.

President al-Shara has achieved significant international diplomatic success, including close relations with Donald Trump and an accelerated pace of sanctions relief.
Despite diplomatic wins, al-Shara has made critical domestic errors by alienating minority groups, specifically the Alawites and Druze, who comprise roughly one-third of the population.
Experts criticize al-Shara's expectation that minorities will "lay down their arms" without being convinced of inclusive governance, labeling this approach "tone deaf."
Without addressing domestic fragmentation, sectarian violence, and economic instability, Syria faces a risk of state collapse that could negate all diplomatic gains.
The administration must resolve these internal fractures to prevent the country from fragmenting before the new parliament takes effect.