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Q3 2026 Frontline plc Earnings Conference Call - FRONTLINE PLC

Dear all, thank you for dialing in to Frontline's quarterly earnings call. We continue to operate in uncharted territory, as there is no playbook for the events this market has seen over the last nine months. I think it's important to note that behind the cash generation seen in the tanker industry in general, there also is operational strain and a growing concern for the safety of our seafarers and the environment. As Frontline is steaming ahead, and the recent correction in rates only moves us from interstellar earnings to astronomical, we're running at a profit margin of about 90%, with revenues 10 times our running costs. Before I give the word to Inger, I'll run through our TC numbers on slide three in the deck. For Frontline's third quarter of 2026, we made $148,500 per day on our spot trading VLCCs, $102,500 per day on our Spot Trading Suisse Maxes and $67,800 per day on our LR2 slash Afro Maxes. So far in the fourth quarter of 2026, 68% of our VLCC days are booked at $562,600 per day. 69% of our SUSEMax days are booked at $324,300 per day, and 68% of our LA2 slash AFRA max days at $190,800 per day. Unprecedented numbers and all up in the six digits. I need to remind the audience that these numbers are still on a low to discharge basis with the implications of ballast days at the end of the quarter that may occur. But even though this, we face a record-breaking fourth quarter. Now I'll let Inger take you through the financial highlights. Inger Nilsson- Thanks, Lars, and good morning and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let's then turn to slide four and look at the profit statement highlights. We report a profit of $641.4 million, or $2.88 per share, and adjusted profit of $530.9 million, $2 and 38 cents per share in this quarter. The adjusted profit in the third quarter decreased by $49.3 million compared with the previous quarter primarily due to a decrease in our TCE earnings. The ship operating expenses decreased by 2.1 million dollars from previous quarter and that was mainly due to sale of two Suez Max tankers in the second quarter and two VCCs in the third quarter but also to a a decrease in general running costs for the remaining fleet which was then partially offset by a decrease in supplier rebates. The administrative expenses decreased by $1.6 billion from the previous quarter, and this excludes the synthetic optional evaluation loss of $1,2 million in the third quarter and the gain of $5,3 billion in the second quarter. The adjusted interest expense decreased by$1 million from the previously quarter, primarily due to lower interest rate margins. Depreciation increased by 4.4 million from the previous quarter and that was due to the delivery of six new buildings in the second and third quarter partially offset by sale of vessels Let's then look at the balance sheet on slide 5 Frontline has a solid balance sheet and a strong liquidity of 1.4 billion in cash and cash equivalents, and that is including undrawn amounts of revolver capacity of 1.1 billion dollars in multiple securities and minimum cash requirements at the end of September. We have no debt maturities until 2028, and we have no meaningful maturities until 2031. And this is supported by increased tenor across the portfolio, as shown in the maturity chart on the slide the remaining new building commitment at the end of september was 288.7 million and that relates to the acquisition of the nine new buildings from affiliates of haman earlier this year the company has secured new building financing of up to 737 million dollars for all the new buildings as we have sent out in the press release. Let's then turn to slide six. And let's look at the financing optimizations that we have been doing recently. From June to November 2026, we lowered the weighted average interest rate margin by 60 basis points, from 178 basis points at the end of the first quarter of 2026 to 118 basis point at the date of this presentation. That was made through margin reductions on existing facilities and full refinancing of selected facilities. The reduction was driven by amendments with 23 basis points, refinancing with 27 basis points and new building financing and asset sales with 10 basis points. The total RCS capacity increased from 473 million at the end of the first quarter of 2026 and then up to 2.37 billion at the third quarter of 2026, of which then 1.2 billion was drawn and 1.1 billion was undrawn. This RCF structure allows the company flexibility to manage liquidity actively without holding excess cash on the balance sheet. Let's then move to slide seven and look at the fleet composition and the cash break even on an OPEX. Upon delivery of the remaining VLCC new buildings and the sale of two VLTCs, our fleet composition consists of 40 VLCCs, 19 SUSEmax tankers, and 18 Afravax-slash-LR2 tankers. And has an average age of 6.9 years, consists of 100% ecovessels, where 69% are scrubber fitted. We estimate average cash break-even rate for the next 12 months of approximately $24,100 per day for VLCC's, $25,200 per day for SUSEMAX tankers and $2,600 per day for LR2 tankers, with a fleet average estimate of about $23,600 per day. This includes dry-dry cost for 10 VSSs, 6 SUSEMAx tankers and 7 LRT tankers. The fleet average estimates excluding dry- cost is about $21,800 per day or $1,800 dollars per day less. We record OPEX including Drydock in the fourth quarter of $8,400 dollars per day for overseas, $10,600 dollars per day for Zeus Maxx tankers and $13,400 dollars per days for LRQ tankers. And this includes Drydock of two Zeus Max tankers and three LRQ tankers in the third quarter. Two, three, 26 fleet average OPEX-excluded dialogue was $8,100 per day. Let's then move to slide eight, cash generation. Frontline has a substantial cash generation potential with about 28,000 earnings days annually. And as you can see from this slide, the cash generation potential basis current fleet, TC rates and spot market rates as of November 19th, is $4.4 billion, or approximately $19.70 per share, providing a cash flow yield of 44% basis current share price. A 30% increase from current spot market will increase the cash generation potential to about $5.8 billion, or $26.10 per share. And a likewise 30% decrease from current stock market will decrease the cash innovation potential to $3 billion, or $13.30 per share, with this I leave the word to Lars again. Thank you, Inger. Let's move to slide nine and look at the market highlights. Middle East continues to be the focal point, and although we almost forget that during the summer months, we had an MOU in place between US and Iran, and we actually started to see risk premiums leaving the market, this quickly changed as the summer came to an end. during the third quarter, the risks of trading both in the Black Sea, in the Red Sea, and in and around the Gulf of Oman increased. The big kind of step change as far as we saw it was that the Middle East-based national oil companies started to take control of their own logistics. The market started to run out of ship owners that were willing to take the risk, even despite the highly high-paid routes, they basically stopped accepting taking the risk of passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The only way for the Middle East exporters to arrange for freight of their oil, and we have to remember this is like a national security issue, was to actually buy the tonnage themselves and move the oil. This way they managed to reduce the rebates they had to offer to the market in order to get the oil exported. Secondly, it also reduced the freight costs, and they didn't have to pay third parties astronomical numbers in order get the oil moving. And this is the situation we basically have now, is that the mother load of the oil being moved through the Strait of Hormuz is actually on tonnage controlled by the exporters themselves. This created further a growing shuttle traffic in the Gulf of Oman, with lengthy ship-to-ship ship transfer activity, increasing the sailing inefficiencies as we proceeded kind of towards the end of Q3 and the start of Q4. Then further, we've had the Yambu pipeline disturbance and also the risk situation specifically in the Red Sea, adding to these challenges. We observe that certain buyers of crude oil actually prefer the oil to go northbound, which is highly inefficient. You you load about the three-fourths of a ship, take it through the Suez Canal, top up at City Carrier, and then you sail all the way around the African continent. All this has drawn a lot of ton miles out of the market and increased utilization, to the point where freight rates peaked close to a million dollars outside of the Strait of Hormuz. But despite all this, or maybe because of all this, global crude oil exports actually moved beyond September 25 heights, as the chart on the top right hand side illustrates. I have to note though that this is October numbers. November numbers is likely to be reduced. During the same period, although the tanker order book continues to grow, the growth or the pace of the growth is slowing, and we now have three and a half fee as lead time if you go to the market to order virtually any ship at this point. We still believe that what's happening around us and what has transpired over the last nine months are going to have long-term implications for the market. We're going to inventory refill, we're going have energy security scrutiny, and also we're gonna see refiners diversify how they source their feedstock. If you look at the market charts on the bottom of this chart, yes, we have corrected quite substantially, but one has to peek over to the left-hand side of this chart and look at what levels we're actually talking about. You know, bottoming out on VLCC is around $250,000 a day, SUSE maxes around $175,000 today, and also you might notice that AfriMax is out of the US Gulf, is straight back up to almost $200,000 per day. So by no means, this is not a freight crisis. Let's move to slide 10 and discuss a little bit more around the flows. So we already mentioned that global crude oil exports have surpassed the heights of September 2025. Parts of this is of course caused by Middle East crude oil export back to pre-conflict levels, but it's also the addition or the incremental barrels coming out of the Atlantic Basin that adds to this. And also it's important that despite the hits on Janbu, flows have resumed and added a lot of output from the region, as we can see on the top right-hand chart. What's also very interesting to observe, and this is the bottom chart, is that the Asian imports, excluding China, is extremely firm and is well beyond seasonal patterns. And then we can only imagine what will happen when or if China resumes full import volumes. They're still lagging about two million barrels behind the average of Q4 2025. We've also seen some positive moves on the products trade. This trade has been laggard largely due to protectionism amongst producers, but also the lack of ample exports, particularly from China. But now we are starting to see from the Middle East at least, it's a huge refining region, that the clean trade is starting to drizzle through, despite the disturbance in the Strait of Hormuz. Again, this is data into October. I think everybody who has followed the recent events in the strait of Hromuz, we should probably expect a little bit of reduction here. But this is a firmish long-term trend that, of course, depending on activity, we think is going to continue. I I think one thing that's very important to remember, and I mentioned it on the previous slide, the EIA expects world inventory bills to the tune of 4 million barrels per day in 2027. This comes on top of their expected consumption of 104.5 million barrels a day. Since the inventory bills are happening primarily then in the U.S. and also in Asia, particularly the Asian part of this, is going to be crude transported. But again, the recent deterioration in the security situation of the Strait of Hormuz will have an impact short-term, particularly on the US exports trade. But this is going to a positive one, because we're already seeing that with the current kind of very prompt lack of oil coming out of the strait of Hromuz, we're already seeing ARBs from the US starting to work into Europe. And secondly, it would start to work to Asia. Let's move to slide 11. And this is a slide we wanted to show basically to kind of show you how sensitive this market, and particularly so the VLCC, to small changes in kind of how the population of tankers are positioned. If you assume we have around a bit north of 900 VLCCs in the market, and I think it's better to read it on the right hand slide chart, sorry, the left and the right slide actually show more or less the same, but it's probably easier to see on the left side. So if you assume that we have a bit over 900 VLCCs globally. Currently, 241 of them are either about 20 years of age, or dark, or sanctioned. We believe China controls a bit north of 100 VLCC. These are all being utilized for the existing import of Chinese crude. We have not seen Chinese charters active in the market for the last six months, you could say. And they take care of China's import from primarily West Africa, but also the other cargoes that come out. And then you have a fleet of about 200 vessels, which is controlled by national oil companies and other kind of major oil companies. And then, you have to look at the orange kind of last column here, which is actually the independent traders, and of course Sinocor, which is a fleet that's below 400 vessels. This is the fleet that gets affected by the ever-changing trading patterns, and ARBs opening and shutting. This is also why any kind of disturbance to the trade becomes quite violent in the freight rate terms. As far as we can analyze, currently there is about 70 VLCCs involved in the shuttling of crude in and out of the Hormuz Strait. This is a mixture of the column which we call national oil companies and the pure spot players. But This is almost 10% of the fleet that is below 20 years, not dark and not sanctioned, but looking at the actively traded fleet, it's nearing 20%. We also know that this fleet is constantly being exposed to disturbance by way of attacks, and there are certain market sources that that are putting into the numbers that between 1% and potentially 2% of the VLCC fleet is currently either under repairs or in some cases becoming a total loss. Then I'd like to move to slide 12 and look at the order books. This is an alarming picture for anybody that's been in shipping for a long period of time. And historically, we would say that the party is over. But there is some granularity here. If you look at the current high order book levels, which is on average 27% for the asset classes that we engage, you also have to have a look at a column for 15 plus years. are the vessels that will come to age as the order book delivers. And this can, and we hope, will cushion the impacts of the very large delivery years we are approaching. To further exemplify this, we have a slide on page 13, where we're trying to do kind of an indication or show you the net fleet developments as the order books look right now. We've come up with a new term and this is the debit fleet. So this is the fleet that under normal circumstances probably wouldn't be around and this is kind of going to form a cushion as we move forward because it's likely to be expected that the debit fleet is going to be starting to move to recycling yards if this market breaks in any kind of severe manner. If you keep that into consideration, at the same time look at how the fleet age as we move forward into 2030. We're actually only looking at the peak fleet growth of between six and seven percent in 2028, the way the order books looks right now. And this is all due to the simple fact that although we have a very high order book, we also have the highest observed average age of the global tanker fit that we've had for decades. Then I'd like to move us to slide 14 and the quick summary. And we question, Are we currently trading low in the mother of all cycles? I actually did this headline on Monday or Tuesday, and I can say that we're already in a situation where freight rates are actually starting to move north again after having kind of fallen for the last two, three weeks. But we still have historically high freight rates, and they are to some extent also challenging the oil trading complex. This is a development that will ebb and flow, because the trade needs to have room for the freight, so it means that the arms need to widen in order for oil to be transported. We have seen that when we reached the peaks back in October, oil actually stopped moving, but the levels we are now, the oil can start to move again. I think we'll be very high, but we'll also be ebbing and flowing depending on the supply of oil coming to the market. As we already mentioned, global crude exports is beyond September 25 heights, and I don't think any of you had that on your bingo card back in May, June. Asia imports, ex-China, is recovering beyond historical and seasonal highs, which is a positive. And the energy security and inventory situation is likely to dominate the narrative sphere. The long-term implications of fleet aging, inefficiency, and expanding trade patterns will cushion the impact of the order books as far as we see. And frontline continue to be central stage, where our model modern we also see heavy fleet and we also need to note that the long-term period market implies lasting disruptions and fairly high tank markets and with that I will open up for questions thank you to ask a question you will need to press star 1 and 1 on your telephone and wait for your name to be announced. To withdraw your question, please press star 1 and 1 again. One moment for our first question. And the first question comes from John Chappell from Evercore ISI. Please go ahead. Thank you. Good afternoon. Lars, I'm going to start where you finished, the long-term period market. I think it's in the press release. You have 17 ships on time charter right now, which is pretty elevated given Frontline's history of being more exposed to the spot market. You've talked about a lot of the uncertainty, a lot OF the volatility, that recent pull down, the last couple of days tick up. Is this an opportunity for you to maybe continue to tweak the Frontline operating model and take advantage of the maximum inefficiency and disruption and lock in more cash flow or do you think you still want to be kind of um you know full hilt to the to the spot market well it's a it's good question and and um as you you perfectly well know but for the audience you know most of uh the tc cover that we have on is fairly short dated so it means that a lot of these time charter contracts were done early in the year uh with lack of a crystal ball. We actually didn't see this happening when these were concluded. So these will come off kind of starting in Q1 and during Q1, which means we have an opportunity to reload kind of time shorter cover at higher levels. When we decide to do that is difficult to say, because the challenge in this market is that the near-term kind of cash generation you can do on on spot uh means that these time charter curves are steeply backwardated so it's uh it kind of hurts to make those decisions but i think as a general note you should expect front line to have a much higher degree of time charter coverage as we proceed uh you know compared to previous years so so i hope that answers your question it does and it and it segues to my follow-up too i mean I mean, obviously, it does hurt given the spot market levels right now. But, you know, as you kind of insinuated, if didn't say directly, there is some fragility to those numbers. I thought this first bullet point on your last slide was really interesting in the commentary around challenging the oil trading complex. Do you think what we saw in October is somewhat of a perceived ceiling on how high rates can go before it starts to change the global trading patterns? And, you know, within the context of possibly a higher floor, given the inventory restocking, the continued inefficiencies, geopolitical uncertainty, and now maybe potentially a ceiling that we can identify, is it more violent within maybe a tighter, incredibly elevated, but still a tighter range, do you think, over the next 12 months? It's very hard to say. You know, these are not kind of fixed boundaries, right? What we saw and what propelled the rates into the stratosphere was, I think, kind of more desperation than economics, you know, kind of refiners facing having to shut in refinery runs, which is far more costly than what any freight can be. But then I think also kind of why we dived off the peaks was probably due to far more volume oil. The oil market in general became far better supplied as the trade through Hormuz became fairly efficient. So I think to answer that question, at the end of the day, it's going to be how much oil volume is going to available to the market. As the oil price have indicated, you know kind of at least for a few weeks now it's been plenty uh but you know if if the export or the challenges to oil exports out of the inner uh kind of middle east gulf persists going forward for weeks maybe we'll we'll have a situation where where you know the marginal barrel will be much harder to get hold of and you know where where trade both traders and refiners will have to account for the increased freight cost. This is a little bit, whether it's the dog or the tail or whatever the expression is, but I think it's a fact that freight, to some extent, stopped the ARBs, but it's also a fact that that happened at the same time as far more oil volume than people expected started to flow through, particularly the Middle East. So it's difficult to say. I think the one to watch, of course, is this volume or the reduction of the volume that we might have observed recently being able to come through the straight hormones. Okay. Thank you, Lars. Thank you. Thank you We are now going to take the next question. And this question comes from Greg Lewis from BTG. BTIG, please go ahead. Hey, thank you, and good afternoon, and thanks for taking my questions. You know, Lars, I'd love to get more thoughts around slide 11 and those 70Bs that are kind of in that shuttle trade. Really what I'm trying to understand is, you know, you mentioned some of those are like, you now, captive fleets. um did we see vessels maybe that had been used to store oil enter that enter the shuttle trade um you know kind of like you know as we think about those vessels um you Know what's kind of the utilization because you know those vessels would be moving through anyway kind of Like I guess maybe like what are the wait times on the other side of the straight that's kind you know hampering their extracting utilization you know as we think about those 70 V's you know how inefficient do we think that is to the market you know it's a very good question and also very difficult to answer of course I would like yeah you know I would like to answer it maybe potentially in a different manner you know there are actors in this market who are also publicly listed who have performed the Hormuz trade. If you look at some of the numbers that they are making public, it's about half of what the TD3C index has implied. So that basically means that although your headline number is more than a million dollars per day, what you can actually churn out of it in tce terms due to inefficiencies due to the weighting that you just mentioned and and you know it's not like you you know say it's a 10 to 11 day voyage to go you know dip in and out of the strait of hormuz obviously it takes much longer uh because of you know changing security situation uh attacks you don't wanna you know sail uh kind of uh the minute uh there is activity, the STS activity takes time as well and maybe you wait to load at the terminals and all that stuff. So it looks like the inefficiency is fairly high in that trade and what you're actually able to capture in money as a ship owner is a little bit less in a TCE equivalent than maybe what the market has anticipated. As Frontline we don't participate in that trade, but of course we note the headline numbers. But I think that that maybe answers some of your questions. Secondly, we were just in Dubai a couple of weeks or a week back, met kind of all our key clients in the region, and we understand that kind of the incidents in the shuttle market is quite under-reported, so it's been an increasing threat. You have incidents happening two or three times a day, of course not necessarily severe, enough to mean that the vessel needs to undergo some sort of repair before it can partake in the trade again. But mind you, the 70 vessels, this is also a floating target. But I think, and this is probably a good point to mention, how the US have opened up for that you can get an amnesty or get pulled off the OFAC list if you apply. In that application process you actually have to explain what is the purpose or what will be the purpose of the ship and as far as we understand the only purpose you can have is to partake in this shuttle trade. So that 70 number might actually increase as we move forward because that's the only possibility you have to capitalize on vessels that are heavily sanctioned by the U.S. Okay, super helpful. And then I did have my second question I wanted to ask is around the order book. Obviously, you lay it out in the chart. But as you think about digging deeper into those numbers, clearly everybody sees the 60-ish vessels that are scheduled to deliver next year, then there's that massive ramp the following year. I guess my question is kind of around this. I feel like in average years, we've seen some shipyards or ships get pushed back into the following year. It seems like there's 5% to 10% slippage in an average year, and I'm curious your thoughts around that. And then the other question is, I imagine you've done a lot of diligence on a lot of these shipyards and probably visited most of them. What do you think the actual ability is of these yards to go from saying making 60 ships as an industry to 130, i.e., as challenging as 28 looks, could we see a scenario where you know maybe 28 29 and 30 kind of smooth out yeah no both um both two good questions and you know slippage was kind of a keyword in in our presentations uh kind of pre 2020 uh and you're right you know it was uh you know ranging between 5 and 15 percent actually for any year um yeah and i think it's important for you and the audience to understand that i don't think we can introduce 60 or 100 vlccs to the market any year really without actually you know seeing the markets come under some pressure the the the you know the idea here is are we going into pressure that's going to really put a dent in the market or or will it just kind of, you know, put a slight pressure on rates, you know, during kind of the peak delivery periods. As far as we understand, most of the 2027 vessels are actually coming in the second half of the year, which could be a challenge, of course. But it all depends on where we are kind of market wise at that point in time, what's the situation between US and Iran, and what's the kind of energy complex in general. But with that, moving over to the yards, what we understand, and we've actually seen this, is that some of the most expansive yards, the yards that have added a lot of capacity in the last couple of years, are actually starting to struggle with the getting skilled workforce. So it means that the way these yards work is that you have an existing yard, you add the dock, and then you can build a new series of ship, right? But you need a lot of people to work in that dock. You need a load of skilled welders and other sorts of quite highly qualified people. We are at the point now where even in China, they're struggling to get hold of this, to the point where certain CPRs are starting to start standing outside their competitors, offering people as they leave work a job with their kind of setup. So this is creating some sort of inflation also in how you enumerate the workers. So I think even in China, you might be getting close to limit to how much it can grow from here. So that makes us quite comfortable that we're not going to see an aggressive increase in the capacity to build ships. And also, I think it's important to note that it's still so that other segments, non-tankier segments, are also ordering ships at the various yards. So there is no margin pressure for these guys as of yet. Super helpful. Thank you very much. Thank you, Greg. Thank you. We are now going to take the next question. And this one comes from Rohitha from Makalu Fund Management. Please go ahead. Yes, hi. I have two questions. First question is about inventory plans. As you know, many countries have announced plans to increase their crude oil inventory over and above what it was last year. Of course, freight rates play a big role in when those inventories are refilled, because they'll have to be exported. Can you give us a sense of where freight rates have to before countries can start thinking about rebuilding their crude oil inventories? That's a hard one, Rahid. But I thank you for picking up on the point, which is a very good one. When this situation happened in February, there were some big consuming countries, I can name India, I can name Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, that found themselves in a situation where they actually didn't have sufficient neither strategic nor commercial storage, created an issue for them and you're rightfully say there are plans to expand these you know their capacity to store oil both commercially and strategically but I don't necessarily think it's a freight question I think it the oil price question so so you know at least what we've seen historically is that for China they seem to be motivated by low oil prices that's when they go in and and replenish their inventories. And freight is not really what's making it, kind of making them stop to put it that way. But again, we also believe that we are not gonna have like this October supermarket for extended period of time. So if you really want an answer, right now we seem to have pretty normalized markets. We see the trade working, but we're still kind of, you know, between $200,000 and $300,000 per day on the VLCC. So maybe that's the answer. Okay. My second question is that the Atlantic Ocean exports have picked up considerably this year. And, you Know, structurally, it looks like the Atlantic will become more and more important for crude oil exports. So as this shift moves from the Middle East to the Atlantic slowly over time, how much of an impact do you see this having on the tanker market? I think it's going to be very positive, and if you look at it, and India has already said they will. Korea has already committed to taking more barrels from Atlantic Basin exporters going forward. But the interesting part here is what will then happen to the Middle East barrels, because they will have to then find another home. I think you can have a very interesting trade developing here, where you'll have increased flows from the Atlantic Basin to the Far East, but then you'll also have an increased flow from the Middle East to the continent, which is the perfect storm for us as ship owners. So, but I think as a general, we will see tonn miles gradually increase whenever this, you know, comes to fruitation. Can you give us a sense of how much impact that would be? Let's say you had to shift a million barrels from the Middle East to Asia, instead from Atlantic to Asia. How much would that increase in VLCC demand? Well, it's 30% just there on the voyage length. Okay, so 30% more. Okay, great. Thank you very much, Lars. Thank you. Thank you, we are now going to take the next question. And this one comes from Audrey Zong from China Securities. Please go ahead. Hi, good afternoon, Lars and Inge. This is Audrey ZONG from China Securities and thank you for taking my question. Actually, I think you have touched a little bit about this question. I want to know, looking at 2027, there are three key variables, growing cargo volumes, shorter average voyage distances as Middle Eastern barrels replace Atlantic supplies, and additional vessel days absorbed by shuttle operations and STS transfers. How do you assess their net impact on vessel demand with new building deliveries adding supply? Under what conditions will you expect average VLCC sport TCEs in 2027 to exceed the already strong levels of 2026? Thank you. Well, thank you, Audrey. If I had the answer to that, an exact one, I would probably not work here. But this is like an equation with many unknowns, right? I think if you assume that we're going to be continuing like we are doing now with the with the kind of time consuming uh trade uh out of the or day consuming trade out of The Middle East um you know the Atlantic basin doing at the end you know what it does right now and you add a lot of modern efficient ships to the market uh we are certainly not going to have the market that we observed in October. Because there's more capacity coming to this market. And I don't think, you know, it's not like the Middle East are going to surpass their volumes materially from what they did earlier in October. So maybe that answers a little bit of your question. But then again, you know I think the situation is going to be very fluid. And you know it's going to to be fluid going forward. So I would like to kind of maybe answer it differently. There are extremely smart charters that are willing to pay $100,000 per day for a three-year time charter for a VLCC. And the backwardation in the curve tells us that this is the market we have now, and the market that we had a month ago is not going to last forever. But the floor is going to be far higher than what we have observed in previous cycles. I think that's how I would answer it. Yeah. Thank you, Olaf. That's very helpful. Thank you very much. Thank you, Audrey. Thank you. As a reminder, to ask a question, you will need to press star 1 and 1 on your telephone keypad. That is star 1 and 1 to ask a question. There seems to be no further questions for today. I will now hand the call back to Lars Barstad for closing remarks. Thank you very much and thank you for listening in. Very interesting times, exhausting times to some degree. Let's hope for some sort of solution in the Middle East situation. Let's just see how this plays out. Thank you.

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FRONTLINE PLC
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FRONTLINE PLC