Interview
The case that war isn't in decline | Bear Braumoeller (2022)
- Renewed great power competition between the US and China is expected, with Taiwan identified as a significant potential trigger for war, though the risk is tempered by cultural barriers and the possibility that modern international orders suppress conflict compared to the baseline anarchy of the past.
- Research indicates that international orders are the primary driver of conflict rates, with systems like the Concert of Europe maintaining peace for roughly 50 years following the Napoleonic Wars, whereas the absence of such orders or the existence of multiple competing orders tends to substantially increase the likelihood of war between major powers.
- Statistical analysis of conflict from 1815 to the present suggests a drop in the global rate of conflict initiation of over 50% following the end of the Cold War and a drop around the Cuban Missile Crisis, while conflict initiation saw an increase in the 1860s, though the absolute count of wars of all types has remained relatively flat for two centuries.
- While the Enlightenment introduced new rationales for war such as nationalism and humanitarian intervention, the Kantian triad of trade, institutions, and democracy is expected to reduce conflict, with trade and institutions considered more critical than democracy, and the Concert of Europe is viewed as the first explicit system prioritizing peace maintenance.
- Prospects for peace rely on the belief that information regarding the high costs of escalation and the dangers of war initiation can deter conflict, as historical data shows that while anti-war sentiment peaked between the World Wars, it failed to prevent war, and recent wars have led to overcompensation in fear regarding large-scale conflict.
- Limitations in current data analysis include potential biases from excluding non-European states, the difficulty of applying standard statistical tests like the central limit theorem to power law distributions of war, and the challenge of distinguishing between war initiation rates and escalatory propensity, which has reportedly remained constant since 1815.
- Strategic plans to maintain peace involve major powers potentially prioritizing international stability over domestic ideology, the expectation that sanctions serve as effective warnings against invasion, and the hope that cultural works or public discourse highlighting the mutual costs of war can make escalation risks more salient to state actors.