Jun 22, 2026, 4:45 PM ETConference Presentation, Panel

The New Macro Playbook | Global Conference 2026

Global capital flows are shifting from a U.S.-centric "black hole" model to a diversified inflow strategy, with emerging markets re-emerging as a significant asset class for global portfolios (pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices).
Investors are increasingly reallocating toward natural resource and commodity-linked economies and regions perceived as geopolitically predictable, moving away from exclusive reliance on the U.S. tech sector.
The economy remains bifurcated: U.S. sectors dominated by AI receive heavy capital, while older industries face capital shortages; globally, a 30–40 year era of low rates has ended, with competitive rates now available in Japan and elsewhere, creating a level playing field for the dollar.
De-dollarization and the end of the "dollar play" are described as being in "early chapters," driven by a transition from efficiency-based globalization to sovereign security-based supply chains.

The global paradigm has shifted to "modern mercantilism," where nations prioritize maximizing domestic wealth and strength over efficiency, leading to inflationary spending on defense, infrastructure, and rare earth minerals to close vulnerabilities.
Two massive, non-cyclical forces dominate the current economy: geopolitical fragmentation (weaponization of supply chain vulnerabilities) and a massive global build-out of AI infrastructure driven by scaling laws.
Spending is currently decoupled from demand, driven by sovereign mandates for resilience, resulting in an economy that is "misshapen" with strong headline numbers but potentially weaker employment growth due to capital-intensive, low-labor AI construction.
A "K-shaped" economy persists where consumer sentiment is low, yet aggregate spending and market performance remain strong due to concentrated efficiency gains in AI and fiscal support.

The current inflationary environment is characterized as a classic supply shock (e.g., producer prices rising due to oil >$100 and geopolitical conflict) rather than a demand-driven shock, necessitating higher rates for a longer period globally.
While volatility is expected to increase due to geopolitical conflicts and supply chain vulnerabilities (e.g., helium and chip shortages in the Middle East), it may not remain high indefinitely if conflicts are mitigated, though short-to-medium term inflation will persist.
Emerging markets are experiencing immediate distress from supply shortages, including 30% increases in construction material costs in India and fuel/cooking oil shortages in Kenya, lagging before impacts are fully felt in the U.S.
Market participants are currently underexposed to physical assets and real assets, as most global portfolios remain highly concentrated in U.S. equities, leaving them vulnerable to a world where inflation and physical asset demand are rising.

Record sovereign deficits in the U.S., France, UK, and Japan, driven by post-pandemic spending and defense build-ups, are creating "crowding out" risks where capital is retained domestically rather than flowing globally.
There is a rising risk of "financial repression" (wealth taxes, money transfer taxes, or inflationary monetization) in developed democracies as governments struggle to manage debt without a productivity boom to offset it.
Wealth disparity and "K-economies" are creating a risk of political upheaval and class struggle, potentially leading to elected leaders realigning resources socially in ways not currently priced into equity or credit markets.
Divergent fiscal outcomes are visible: Europe's new spending is viewed as potentially growth-enhancing (defense/energy), whereas U.S. deficits are viewed with more negativity due to the scale of debt relative to growth.

The current AI boom is in a "CapEx phase" (building infrastructure) which is highly profitable and capital-intensive but not yet employment-heavy; the "adoption phase" (productivity gains) is expected to follow over the next 5–10 years.
Tokenization and digital assets (e.g., tokenized money funds) are poised to replace traditional low-interest demand deposits, likely leading to higher costs of credit and a fundamental shift in banking revenue models over the next decade.
The "Genius Act" and regulatory clarity in the U.S. are forcing G7 nations to engage with digital assets, potentially reinforcing the dollar's reserve status by setting the global standard for digital infrastructure.
Private markets are seeing a reversal trend, with capital moving back toward public markets (equities and credit) as liquidity in private assets tightens.

The world is fragmenting into isolated economic ecosystems ("fortress North America," "fortress Europe," "fortress Asia") driven by national champions and industrial policy, rather than a unified global market.
The U.S. dollar's status as the global reserve currency remains secure for the next 4–16 years, contingent on China's unwillingness to make the Renminbi fully convertible and its desire to remain a geopolitical reference without the full costs of a reserve currency.
China is emerging as a more dominant Foreign Direct Investor (FDI) in emerging markets, particularly in infrastructure, despite not challenging the dollar's reserve status.
The Gulf conflict is predicted to persist in a reduced, modest format through the end of the year, with long-term implications for energy inputs and supply chain stability.
Future market returns will increasingly depend on the ability of investors to navigate fragmented currency blocks and identify "captive markets" protected by national industrial policies rather than relying on global diversification.